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Abstract
We define a general class of dependent type theories, encompassing Martin-
Löf’s intuitionistic type theories and variants and extensions. The primary aim is
pragmatic: to unify and organise their study, allowing results and constructions
to be given in reasonable generality, rather than just for specific theories. Com-
pared to other approaches, our definition stays closer to the direct or naïve reading
of syntax, yielding the traditional presentations of specific theories as closely as
possible.
Specifically, we give three main definitions: raw type theories, a minimal setup
for discussing dependently typed derivability; acceptable type theories, including
extra conditions ensuring well-behavedness; and well-presented type theories, gen-
eralising how in traditional presentations, the well-behavedness of a type theory is
established step by step as the type theory is built up. Following these, we show
that various fundamental fitness-for-purpose metatheorems hold in this generality.
Much of the present work has been formalised in the proof assistant Coq.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
We give a general definition of dependent type theories, encompassing for example
Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theories and many variants and extensions.
The primary aim is to give a setting for formal general versions of various construc-
tions and results, which in the literature have been given for specific theories but are
heuristically understood to hold for a wide class of theories: for instance, the conser-
vativity theorem of (Hofmann, 1997), or the coherence theorems of (Hofmann, 1995;
Lumsdaine and Warren, 2015).
This has been a sorely felt gap in the literature until quite recently; the present work
is one of several recent approaches to filling it (Isaev, 2017; Uemura, 2019; Brunerie,
2020b).
A secondary aim is to stick very closely to an elementary understanding of syntax.
Established general approaches — for instance, logical frameworks and categorical
semantics — give, in examples, not the original syntax of the example theories, but
an embedded or abstracted version, typically then connected to the original syntax by
adequacy or initiality theorems. Our approach directly recovers quite conventional
presentations of the example theories themselves.
As a corollary of this goal, we must confront the bureaucratic design decisions
of syntax: the selection of structural rules, and so on. These are often swept under
the rug in specific type theories as “routine”; to initiates they are indeed standard, but
newcomers to the field often report finding this lack of detail difficult. We therefore
elide nothing, and set out a precise choice of all such decisions, carefully chosen and
proven to work well in reasonable generality, which we hope will be of value to readers.
In pursuit of the above aims, we offer not one main definition of type theory, but
three, at increasing levels of refinement.
Firstly, we define raw type theories, as a conceptually minimal description of tra-
ditional presentations of type theories by symbols and rules, sufficient to define the
derivability relation, but not yet incorporating any well-formedness constraints on the
rules.
Secondly, we give sufficient conditions on a raw type theory to imply that deriv-
ability over it is well-behaved in various standard ways. Specifically, we isolate simple
syntactic checks that suffice to imply core fitness-for-purpose properties, and package
these into the notion of an acceptable type theory.
Thirdly, we analyse the well-founded nature of traditional presentations, involved
in more elaborate constructions such as the categorical semantics, as well as (arguably)
the intuitive assignment of meaning to a theory. This leads us to the notion of well-
presented type theories, which we hope can serve as a full-fledged proposal fulfilling
our primary aim.
1.2 Specifics
We aim, as far as possible, not to argue for any novel approach to setting up type
theories, but simply to give a careful analysis of how type theories are traditionally
presented, in order to lay out a generality in which such presentations can be situated.
As such, the first few components of our definition are the expected ones.
We begin with an appropriate notion of signature, for untyped syntax with variable-
binding, and develop the standard notions of “raw” syntactic expressions over such
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signatures, including substitution, translation along signature morphisms, and so on.
With the syntax of types and terms properly set up, a type theory is traditionally
presented by giving a collection of rules. Type theorists are very accustomed to reading
these — but as anyone who has tried to explain type theory to a non-initiate knows,
there is a lot to unpack here. The core of our definition is a detailed study of the
situation: what is really going on when we write and read inference rules, check that
they are meaningful, and interpret them as a presentation of type theory?
Take the formation rule for Π-types:
Γ ` A type Γ, x:A ` B type
Γ ` Π(x:A) . B type
When pressed to explain this, most type theorists will say that the rule represents in-
ductive clauses for constructing derivations, or closure conditions for the derivability
predicate: given derivations of the judgements above the line, a derivation of the judge-
ment below the line is constructed. In particular, if Γ, A and B are syntactically valid
representations of a context and types, and the judgements
Γ ` A type, and Γ, x:A ` B type
are both derivable, then so is the judgement
Γ ` Π(x:A) . B type.
This understanding of rules is sufficient for explaining the definition of a specific type
theory, and defining derivability of judgements.
However, it is in general too permissive: to be well-behaved, type theories should
not be given by arbitrary closure conditions, but only by those that can be specified
syntactically by rules looking something like the traditional ones. In other words, we
want to make explicit the idea of a rule as a syntactic entity in its own right, accom-
panied with a mathematically precise explanation of what makes it type-theoretically
acceptable, and how it gives rise to a quantified family of closure conditions.
So to a first approximation, we say a rule consists of a collection of judgements —
its premises — and another judgement, its conclusion. However, a subtlety lurks: what
are Γ, A, and B in the above Π-formulation rule?
The symbol Γ is easy: we can dispense with it entirely. We prescribe (as type the-
orists often do, heuristically) that all rules should be valid over arbitrary contexts, and
so since the arbitrary context is always present in the interpretation of a rule as a family
of closure conditions, it never needs to be included in the syntactic specification of the
rule. This precisely justifies a common “abuse of notation” in presenting type theories:
the context Γ is omitted when writing down the rules, and one mentions apologetically
somewhere that all rules should be understood as over an arbitrary ambient context.
ExplainingA andB is more interesting. They are generally called “metavariables”,
and in the family of closure conditions they are indeed that — quantified variables of
the meta-theory, ranging over syntactic entities. However, if the rule is to be considered
as formal syntactic entity,A andB must themselves be part of that syntax. We therefore
take the premises and conclusion of rules as formed over the ambient signature of the
type theory extended with extra symbols A and B to represent the metavariables of the
rule.
These considerations result in the notion of a raw rule, whose premises and con-
clusion are raw judgements over a signature extended with metavariables. A raw type
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theory is then just a family of raw rules. It holds enough information to be used, but
still permits arbitrariness that must be dispensed with. At the very least, the type and
term expressions appearing in the rule ought to represent derivable types and terms,
respectively. Thus in the next stage of our definition we ask that every rule be accom-
panied with derivations showing that the presuppositions hold, namely, that its type
expressions are derivable types and that its terms have derivable types. Another condi-
tion that we impose on rules is tightness, which roughly requires that the metavariables
symbols be properly typed by the premises, and for rules that build term or a type
judgements, that they do so in the most general form.
Even though every rule of a raw type theory may be presuppositive and tight, the
theory as a whole may be deficient, for example, if one of the symbols has no corre-
sponding formation rule, or several of them. Overall we call a type theory tight when
there is bijective correspondence between its symbols and formation rules, which are
tight themselves. And to make sure equality is well behaved, we also require that for
each symbol there is a suitable congruence rule ensuring that the symbol commutes
with equality. When a raw type theory has all these features, we call it an acceptable
type theory.
Because the derivations of presuppositions appeal to the very rules they certify,
an unsettling possibility of circular reasoning arises. We resolve the matter in two
ways. First, we add one last stage to the definition of type theories and ask that all the
rules, as well as the premises within each rule, be ordered in a well-founded manner.
Second, we show that for acceptable type theories whose contexts and premises are
well-founded as finite sequences, circularities can always be avoided by passing to
the well-founded replacement of the theory (Section 6.5). Apart from expelling the
daemons of circularity, the well-founded order supplies a useful induction principle.
In the end, the definition of a general type theory has roughly five stages:
1. the signature (Definition 3.8) describes the arities of primitive type and term
symbols that form the raw syntax (Definition 3.11),
2. raw rules (Definition 4.18) constitute a raw type theory (Definition 4.36),
3. the raw rules are verified to be tight and presuppositive (Definitions 5.1 and 5.6,
and therefore acceptable (Definition 5.7),
4. the raw type theory is verified to consist of acceptable symbol rules (Defini-
tion 5.11) and equations, that it is tight and congruous, and therefore acceptable
(Definition 5.12).
5. finally, an acceptable type theory may be well-presented (Definition 6.20) and
hence well-founded (Definition 6.19), or we may pass to its well-founded re-
placement (Theorem 6.32).
We readily acknowledge that there are many alternative ways of setting up type
theories, each serving a useful purpose. It is simply our desire to actually give one
mathematically complete description of what type theories are in general.
Once the definition is complete, we should provide evidence of its scope and utility.
We do so in Section 5 by proving fundamental meta-theorems, among which are:
1. Derivability of presuppositions, Theorem 5.15, stating that the presuppositions
of a derivable judgement are themselves derivable.
2. Elimination of substitution, Theorem 5.22, stating that anything that can be de-
rived using the substitution rules can also be derived without them.
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3. Uniqueness of typing, Theorem 5.23, stating that a term has at most one type, up
to judgmental equality.
4. An inversion principle, Theorem 5.27, that reconstructs the proof-relevant part
of the derivation of a derivable judgement from the information given in the
judgement.
Our definitions are set up to support a meta-theoretic analysis of type theories, but
deviate from how type theories are presented in practice. First, one almost always en-
counters only finitary syntax in which contexts and premises are presented as finite se-
quences – we call these sequential contexts and premises and treat them in Sections 6.1
and 6.2. Second, theories are not constructed in five stages, but presented through rules
that are manifestly acceptable and free of circularities, while symbols are introduced
simultaneously with their formation rules. In Sections 6.3 and 6.4 we make these no-
tions precise by defining well-presented rules and theories, and their realisations as
raw type theories.
Having heard tales about minor but insidious mistakes in the literature on the meta-
theory of syntax, we decided to protect ourselves from them by formalising parts of
our paper in the Coq proof assistant (Coq development team, 2020). An overview
of the formalisation is given in Appendix A, including comments about the meta-
mathematical foundations sufficient for carrying out our work. The formalisation al-
lows us to claim a high level of confidence and omission of routine syntactic arguments.
Nevertheless, we still strove to make the paper self-contained by following the estab-
lished standards of informal rigour.
1.3 Disclaimers
Having said what this paper is about, it is worth saying a little about what it is not.
It is most certainly not intended as a prescriptive definition of what all dependent
type theories should be. Many important type theories in the literature are not covered
by our definition, and we do not mean to reject them. The aim of this work is simply
pragmatic: to encompass some large class of theories of interest, in order to better
organise and unify their study. We very much hope our approach may be extended to
wider generalities.
We do not claim or aim to supersede other general approaches to studying type the-
ories, such as those based on logical frameworks. Such approaches are well-developed,
powerful for many applications, and sidestep some complications of the present ap-
proach. However, all such approaches (that we are aware of) work by using a some-
what modified syntax (e.g. embedded in a larger system) — the syntax they yield is
not obviously the same as the syntax given by a “direct” or “naïve” reading of presen-
tations of theories. They are typically accompanied by adequacy theorems, or similar,
showing equivalence between the modified syntax and the naïve, for the specific type
theory under consideration.
By contrast, we aim to directly study and generalise the naïve approach itself, which
(to our knowledge) has not been done previously in such generality. Our motivations
are therefore largely complementary to such approaches. A more detailed comparison
is given in Section 7.
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2 Preliminaries
We begin by setting up definitions and terminology of a general mathematical nature
that we will use throughout.
2.1 Families
For several reasons, we work with families in places where classical treatments would
use either subsets of, or lists from, a given set. While the term is standard (e.g. “the
product of a family of rings”), we make rather more central use of it than is usual, so
we establish some notations and terminology.
Definition 2.1. Given a set X , a family K of elements of X (or briefly, a family
on X) consists of an index set indK and a map evK : indK → X . We let FamX
denote the collection of all families on X , and use the family comprehension notation
〈ei ∈ X | i ∈ I〉 for the family indexed by I that maps i to ei. A family may be
explicitly described by displaying the association of indices to values. For example,
we may write 〈0: e0, 1: e1, 2: e2〉 for the family 〈ei | i ∈ {0, 1, 2}〉.
Example 2.2. Any subset A ⊆ X can be viewed as a family 〈i ∈ X | i ∈ A〉, with
indA asA itself and evA the inclusionA ↪→ X . Motivated by this, we will often speak
of a family K as if it were a subset, writing x ∈ K rather than x ∈ indK, and treating
such x itself as an element of X rather than explicitly writing evK(x).
Example 2.3. Any list ` = [x0, . . . , xn] of elements of X can be viewed as a family,
with ind ` = {0, . . . , n} and ev`(i) = xi, or equivalently ` = 〈0: x0, . . . , n : xn〉. We
will often use list notation to present concrete examples of families.
Working constructively, it is quite important to keep the distinction between fam-
ilies and subsets where classical treatments would confound them. For instance, a
propositional theory is usually classically defined as a set of propositions; we would
instead use a family of propositions. In a derivation over the theory, uses of axioms
therefore end up “tagged” with elements of the index set of the theory, typically ex-
plaining how a certain proposition arises as an axiom (since the same proposition might
occur as an instance of axiom schemes in multiple ways). These record constructive
content which may be needed for, say, interpreting axioms according to a proof by
cases over the axiom schemes of the theory.
Our use of families where most traditional treatments use lists — e.g. for specifying
the argument types of a constructor — is less mathematically significant. It is partly
to avoid baking in assumptions of finiteness or ordering where they are not required;
but it is mostly motivated just by the formalisation, where families provide a more
appropriate abstraction.
Definition 2.4. A map of families f : K → L between families K and L on X is a
map f : indK → indL such that evL ◦f = evK .
We shall notate such a map as 〈f(x)〉x∈indK . Indeed, the notation 〈f(x)〉x∈A
works for any maps f : A→ B, as it is just an alternative way of writing λ-abstractions.
Families and their maps form a category FamX , which is precisely the slice cat-
egory Set/X . A map r : X → Y yields a functorial action r∗ : FamX → FamY
which takes K ∈ FamX to the family r∗K with ind(r∗K) = indK and evr∗K =
r◦evK . It is perhaps clearer to write down the action in terms of family comprehension:
r∗〈ei | i ∈ I〉 = 〈r(ei) | i ∈ I〉.
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Definition 2.5. Given a function r : X → Y and familiesK, L onX , Y respectively, a
map f : K → L over r is a map f : r∗K → L; equivalently, a map f : indK → indL
forming a commutative square over r.
2.2 Closure systems
The general machinery of derivations as closure systems occurs throughout logic, and
is independent of the specific syntax or judgements of the logical systems involved.
Definition 2.6. A closure rule (P, c) on a set X consists of a family P of elements
in X , its premises, and a conclusion c ∈ X . A closure system S on a set X is a
family of closure rules on X , where we respectively write premsR and conclR for
the premises and the conclusion corresponding to a rule R ∈ S. We write RuleX and
ClosX for the collections of closure rules and closure systems on X , respectively.
As is tradition, we display a closure rule with premises [p1, . . . , pn] and conclu-
sion c as
p1 · · · pn
c
The constructions of closure rules and closure systems are evidently functorial in
the ambient set. A map f : X → Y sends a rule R ∈ RuleX to the rule f∗R ∈
RuleY with prems(f∗R) := 〈f(p) | p ∈ premsR〉 and concl(f∗R) := f(conclR).
Similarly, a closure system S on X is taken to the closure system f∗S on Y , defined
by f∗S := 〈f∗r | r ∈ S〉.
Definition 2.7. A simple map S → T between closure systems S and T on X is
just a map between them as families. More generally, a simple map f¯ : S → T over
f : X → Y from S ∈ ClosX to T ∈ ClosY is just a simple map f¯ : f∗S → T , or
equivalently a family map f¯ over f∗ : RuleX → RuleY .
A closure system yields a notion of derivation:
Definition 2.8. Given a closure system S on X , a family H of elements in X , and an
element c ∈ X , the derivations DerS(H, c) of c from hypotheses H are inductively
generated by:
1. for every h ∈ H , there is a corresponding derivation hyph ∈ DerS(H,h),
2. for every rule R ∈ S and a map D ∈ ∏p∈premsR DerS(H, p) there is a deriva-
tion der(R,D) ∈ DerS(H, conclR).
In the second clause above D is a dependent map, i.e., for each p ∈ premsR we
have Dp ∈ DerS(H, p). We do not shy away from using products of families and
dependent maps when the situation demands them.
The elements of DerS(H, c) may be seen as well-founded trees with edges and
nodes suitably labelled fromX , S, andH . We take such inductively generated families
of sets as primitive; their existence may be secured one way or another, depending on
the ambient mathematical foundations. The essential feature of derivations, which we
rely on, is the structural induction principle they provide.
It is easy to check that derivations are functorial in simple maps of closure systems,
in a suitable sense:
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Proposition 2.9. A simple map f¯ : SX → SY of closure systems over f : X → Y
acts on derivations as f¯∗ : DerSX (H, c)→ DerSY (f∗H, f(c)) for each H and c. The
action is moreover functorial, in that id∗ = id and (f¯ ◦ g¯)∗ = f¯∗ ◦ g¯∗.
Often, one wants a more general notion of map, sending each rule of the source
system not necessarily to a single rule of the target system, but instead to a derived
rule:
Definition 2.10. A derivation of a rule R over a closure system S is a derivation of
conclR from premsR over S. Given such a derivation, we call R a derived rule of S,
or say R is derivable over S. A map of closure systems f¯ : S → T over f : X → Y
is a function giving, for each rule R of C, a derivation of f∗R in T .
To show that maps of closure systems preserve derivability, we need a grafting
operation on derivations.
Lemma 2.11. Given an ambient closure system S, suppose D is a derivation of c from
hypotheses H over S, and for each h ∈ H , Dh is a derivation of h from H ′. Then
there is a derivation of c from H ′ over S.
Proof. The derivation of c from H ′ is constructed inductively from a derivation of c
from H:
1. if c is derived as one of the hypotheses h ∈ H , then Dh derives c from H ′,
2. if der(R,D′) derives c fromH , then for each p ∈ premsRwe inductively obtain
a derivation D′′p of p from H
′ from the corresponding derivation D′p of p from
H , and assemble these into the derivation der(R,D′′) of c from H ′.
Definition 2.12. A closure system map f¯ : S → T over f : X → Y acts on deriva-
tions: if D is a derivation of c from H over S, there is a derivation f¯∗D of f(c) from
f∗H over T .
Proof. f¯∗D is defined by recursion on D. Wherever D uses a rule R of S, with deriva-
tions Dh of the premises, f¯∗D uses the given derivation f¯(R) of f∗R, with the deriva-
tions f¯∗Dh grafted in at the hypotheses.
Categorically, grafting can be recognised as the multiplication operation of a monad
structure on derivations, and our maps of closure systems can be seen as Kleisli maps
for this monad (relative to simple maps). One can thus show that they form a category,
that the action on derivations is functorial, and so on. We do not make this precise here,
as it is not required for the present paper.
2.3 Well-founded orders
There will be several occasions when we shall have to prevent dependency cycles (be-
tween premises of a rule, or between rules of a type theory). For this purpose we review
a notion of well-foundedness which accomplishes the task.
Definition 2.13. A strict partial order on a set A is an irreflexive and transitive rela-
tion < on A. A subset S ⊆ A is <-progressive when, for all x ∈ A,
(∀y ∈ A . y < x⇒ y ∈ S)⇒ x ∈ S.
A well-founded order is a strict partial order < in which a subset is the entire set as
soon as it is<-progressive. For each x ∈ A, the initial segment ↓i := {y ∈ A | y < x}
is the set of elements preceding x with respect to the order.
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In terms of an induction principle a strict partial order is well-founded when, for every
predicate ϕ on A,
∀x ∈ A . (∀y ∈ A . y < x⇒ ϕ(y))⇒ ϕ(x)⇒ ∀x ∈ A .ϕ(x).
Classically there are many equivalent definitions of well-founded orders. Construc-
tively, the situation is more complicated, cf. (Taylor, 1999, §2.5); this definition is one
of the most standard, and the most suited to our purpose.
3 Raw syntax
In this section, we set out our treatment of raw syntax with binding, sometimes called
“pre-syntax” to indicate that no typing information is present at this stage. There is
nothing essentially novel — briefly, we use a standard modern treatment, closely in-
spired by that of (Fiore et al., 1999), but focus on concrete constructions rather than cat-
egorical characterisations. So we take raw expressions as inductively generated trees,
and scope systems, developed below, for keeping track of variable scopes and binding.
We spell out the details in order to have a self-contained presentation tailored to our
requirements, and to set up terminology and notation we will use later.
3.1 Scope systems
We first address the question of how to treat variables and binding. Should we use terms
with named variables up to α-equivalence, or de Bruijn indices, or reuse the binding
structure of a framework language? The last option is appealing, as it dispenses with
many cumbersome details, but we shall avoid it precisely because we want to confront
the cumbersome details of type theory.
Rather than choosing a particular answer, we formulate and use a general struc-
ture for binding, abstracting away the implementation-specific details of several ap-
proaches, but retaining the common structure required for defining syntax.
Definition 3.1. A scope system consists of:
1. a collection of scopes S;
2. for each scope γ, a set of positions |γ|;
3. an empty scope 0 with no positions, |0| = ∅;
4. a singleton scope 1 with a unique position, |1| = 1;
5. operations giving for all scopes γ and δ a sum scope γ ⊕ δ, and functions
|γ| inl // |γ ⊕ δ| |δ|inroo
exhibiting |γ ⊕ δ| as a coproduct of |γ| and |δ|.
A scope may be seen as “a context, without the type expressions”: in raw syntax, one
cares about what variables are in scope, without yet caring about their types.
The singleton scope 1 is not needed for most of the development of general type
theories — in the present paper, it is used only for sequential contexts (Section 6.1)
and notions building on these. However, it is present in all examples of interest, so we
include it in the general definition.
9
We will also use scopes to describe binders: if some primitive symbol S binds γ
variables in its i-th argument, then for an instance of S in scope δ, the i-th argument
will be an expression in scope δ ⊕ γ. Most traditional constructors bind finitely many
variables; to facilitate this, we let [n] denote the sum of n ∈ N copies of 1, which also
provides alternative notations [0] and [1] for the empty and singleton scopes, respec-
tively.
Example 3.2. De Bruijn indices and de Bruijn levels can be seen as scope systems,
with N as the set of scopes, |n| := {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, 0 := 0, and m⊕ n := m+ n.
The difference lies just in the choice of coproduct inclusions inl : |m| → |m +
n| ← |n| : inr . Setting inl(i) := i + n, inr(j) = j gives de Bruijn indices, as going
under a binder increments the variables outside it. Setting inl(i) := i, inr(j) = j + n
gives de Bruijn levels, as higher positions go to the innermost-bound variables. Over
these scope systems, our syntax precisely recovers standard de Bruijn-style syntax, as
in (de Bruijn, 1972) and subsequent work.
Both the de Bruijn scope systems are strict in the sense that we have equalities
γ⊕0 = γ = 0⊕γ and (γ⊕δ)⊕η = γ⊕(δ⊕η), whereas general scope systems provide
only canonical isomorphisms. The equalities help reduce bureaucracy in several proofs,
so we shall occasionally indulge in assuming that we work with a strict scope system.
The doubtful reader may consult the formalisation, which makes no such assumptions.
Example 3.3. The finite sets system takes scopes to be finite sets, along with any
choice of coproducts. It may be prudent to restrict to a small collection, say the hered-
itarily finite sets. Syntax over these scope systems gives a concrete implementation of
categorical approaches such as (Fiore et al., 1999).
Example 3.4. Scope systems are not intrinsically linked to dependent type theories, but
provide a useful discipline for syntax of other systems. For instance, in geometric logic,
the infinitary disjunction is usually given with a side condition that the free variables
of the disjunction must remain finite (Johnstone, 2002, D1.1.3(xi)). By using finite
scopes, we can make the finiteness condition explicit from the start, and dispense with
the side condition. This is similar in spirit to (Fiore et al., 1999) and more closely
mirrors the categorical semantics. By contrast, the classical Hilbert-type logics Lα,β
of (Karp, 1964) allow genuinely infinite contexts and binders, which can be obtained
by taking scopes to be ordinals δ ∈ α, with |δ| := δ.
Example 3.5. The traditional syntax using named variables, for both free and bound
variables, is not an example of a scope system. In that approach, a fresh variable is
not introduced by summing with a scope, but rather by a multivalued map allowing
extension by any unused name.
Some implementations of syntax treat free and bound variables separately, for in-
stance locally nameless syntax (McKinna and Pollack, 1993) uses concrete names for
free variables but de Bruijn indices for bound variables. Scope systems as defined here
do not subsume such syntax, but could be generalised to do so.
Categorically, a scope system can be viewed precisely as a category Scope with
initial and terminal objects, binary coproducts, and a full and faithful functor into
(Set, 0,+, 1) preserving this structure. The categorical structure is induced from Set:
morphisms γ → δ are taken as functions |γ| → |δ|— we call these renamings. Two
of these, r : γ → δ and r′ : γ′ → δ′, give a sum map r ⊕ r′ : γ ⊕ γ′ → δ ⊕ δ′ arising
from the universal property of coproducts.
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For the remainder of the paper, we fix a scope system. To make concrete examples
readable, we shall write them using the de Bruijn scopes from Example 3.2. They can
be easily adapted to any other scope system.
3.2 Arities and signatures
While the arity of a simple algebraic operation is just the number of its arguments, the
situation is complicated in type theory by the presence of binders. Each argument of
a type-theoretic constructor may be a term or a type, and some of its variables may be
bound by the constructor. We thus need a suitable notion of arity.
Definition 3.6. By syntactic classes, we mean the two formal symbols ty and tm,
representing types and terms respectively. An arity α is a family of pairs (c, γ) where
c is a syntactic class and γ is a scope. We call the indices of α arguments and write
argα for the index set of α. Thus, each argument i ∈ argα has an associated syntactic
class clα i and a scope bindα i, which we call the binder associated with the argument i,
and we can write α as α = 〈(clα i,bindα i) | i ∈ argα〉.
Example 3.7. In Martin-Löf type theory with the de Bruijn scope system, the con-
structor Π has arity [(ty, 0), (ty, 1)]. That is, the arity has two type arguments, and
binds one variable in the second argument. A simpler example is the successor symbol
in arithmetic whose arity is [(tm, 0)], because it takes one term argument and binds
nothing. Still simpler, the arity of a constant symbol is the empty family.
Note that arities express only the basic syntactic information and do not specify the
types of term arguments and bound variables, which will be encoded later by typing
rules.
Definition 3.8. A signature Σ is a family of pairs of a syntactic class and an arity. We
call the elements of its index set symbols. Thus each symbol S ∈ Σ has an associated
syntactic class cS and an arity αS . A type symbol is one whose associated syntactic
class is ty, and a term symbol is one whose associated syntactic class is tm. The
arguments argS of S are the arguments of its arity αS . Each argument i ∈ argS has
an associated syntactic class clS i and binder bindS i, as prescribed by the arity αS .
Example 3.9. The following signature describes the usual constructors for dependent
products:
Π 7→ (ty, [(ty, 0), (ty, 1)]),
λ 7→ (tm, [(ty, 0), (ty, 1), (tm, 1)]),
app 7→ (tm, [(ty, 0), (ty, 1), (tm, 0), (tm, 0)]).
Let us spell out the last line. The symbol app builds a term, because its syntactic class
is tm, from four arguments. The first and the second arguments are types, with one
variable bound in the second argument, while the third and the fourth arguments are
terms. We thus expect an application term to be written as app(A,B, s, t), with one
variable getting bound in B.
Definition 3.10. A signature map F : Σ→ Σ′ is a map of families between them, that
is, a function from symbols of Σ to symbols of Σ′, preserving the arities and syntactic
classes. Signatures and maps between them form a category Sig.
11
3.3 Raw syntax
Once a signature Σ is given, we know how to build type and term expressions over it.
We call this part of the setup “raw” syntax to emphasise its purely syntactic nature.
Definition 3.11. The raw syntax over Σ consists of the collections of raw type ex-
pressions ExprtyΣ(γ) and raw term expressions Expr
tm
Σ (γ), which are generated in-
ductively for any scope γ as follows:
1. for every position i ∈ |γ|, there is a variable expression vari ∈ ExprtmΣ (γ);
2. for every symbol S ∈ Σ of syntactic class cS , and a map
e ∈∏i∈arg S ExprclS iΣ (γ ⊕ bindS i),
there is an expression S(e) ∈ ExprcSΣ (γ), the application of S to arguments e.
Let us walk through the definition. The first clause states that the positions of γ
play the role of available variable names, still without any typing information. The
second clause explains how to build an expression with a symbol S: for each argument
i ∈ argS, an expression ei of a suitable syntactic class must be provided, where ei
may refer to variable names given by γ as well as the variables that are bound by S
in the i-th argument. The expressions ei are conveniently collected into a function e.
When writing down concrete examples we write the arguments as tuples.
Example 3.12. The symbol Π has arity [(ty, 0), (ty, 1)]. So if A is a type expression
with free variables amongst γ⊕0 (which is isomorphic to γ), andB is a type expression
with free variables in γ ⊕ 1 (which has an extra free variable available), then Π(A,B)
is a type expression with free variables in γ.
Definition 3.13. The action of a renaming r : γ → δ on expressions is the map
r∗ : ExprcΣ(γ)→ ExprcΣ(δ), defined by structural recursion:
r∗(vari) := varr(i),
r∗(S(e)) := S(〈(r ⊕ idbindS i)∗(ei)〉i∈arg S).
Note how the definition uses the functorial action of ⊕ to extend the renaming r when
it descends under the binders of a symbol.
Definition 3.14. The action of a signature map F : Σ → Σ′ on expressions is the
map F∗ : ExprcΣ(γ)→ ExprcΣ′(γ), defined by structural recursion:
F∗(vari) := vari,
F∗(S(e)) := F (S)(F∗ ◦ e).
Proposition 3.15. The actions by renamings and signature maps commute with each
other, and respect identities and composition. That is, they make expressions into a
functor Expr : Sig × Scope→ Set{ty,tm}.
3.4 Substitution
We next spell out substitution as an operation on raw expressions, and note its basic
properties.
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Definition 3.16. A raw substitution f : γ → δ over a signature Σ is a map f : |δ| →
ExprtmΣ (γ). The extension f ⊕ η : γ ⊕ η → δ ⊕ η by a scope η is the substitution
(f ⊕ η)(inl(i)) := inl∗(f(i)) if i ∈ |δ|,
(f ⊕ η)(inr(j)) := varinr (j) if j ∈ |η|.
The (contravariant) action of f on an expression e ∈ ExprcΣ(δ) gives the expression
f∗e ∈ ExprcΣ(γ), as follows:
f∗(vari) := f(i),
f∗(S(e)) := S(〈(f ⊕ bindS i)∗ei〉i∈argS).
Example 3.17. The above definition, specialized to the de Bruijn scope systems of Ex-
ample 3.2, precisely recovers the usual definition of substitution with de Bruijn indices
or levels. Their explicit shift operators are abstracted away, in our setup, as renaming
under coproduct inclusions.
Definition 3.18. Any renaming r : γ → δ induces a substitution r¯ : δ → γ, with
r¯(i) := varr(i). In particular, each scope δ has an identity substitution idδ : i 7→ vari.
Substitutions f : γ → δ and g : δ → θ may be composed to give a substitution
g ◦ f : γ → θ, defined by (g ◦ f)(k) := f∗(g(k)).
We often write r instead of r¯, a slight notational abuse grounded in the next propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.19. For all suitable renamings r, substitutions f , g, and expressions e:
1. Substitution generalises renaming: r¯∗e = r∗e.
2. Identity substitution is trivial: id∗δ e = e.
3. Substitution commutes with renaming:
r∗(f∗e) = (i 7→ r∗f(i))∗e and f∗(r∗e) = (i 7→ f(r(i)))∗e.
4. Substitution respects composition: f∗(g∗e) = (g ◦ f)∗.
5. Composition of substitutions is unital and associative:
f = id ◦f = f ◦ id and f ◦ (g ◦ h) = (f ◦ g) ◦ h.
Proof. All direct by structural induction on expressions, as in the standard proofs for
de Bruijn syntax.
The interaction of substitutions with signature maps is similarly straightforward:
signature maps act functorially on raw substitutions, and the constructions of this sec-
tion are natural with respect to the action. More precisely:
Proposition 3.20. Given a signature map F : Σ → Σ′, and a raw substitution f :
δ → γ over Σ, there is a raw substitution F∗f : δ → γ over Σ′ given by (F∗f)(i) =
F∗(f(i)), and the action respects composition and identities in F . Moreover, given
such F , for all suitable f and e, we have F∗(f∗e) = (F∗f)∗(F∗e); similarly, for all
suitable f , g, we have F∗(f ◦ g) = F∗f ◦ F∗g.
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3.5 Metavariable extensions and instantiations
As mentioned in the introduction, when we write down the rules of type theories, we
will need to extend the ambient signature Σ by new symbols to represent the metavari-
ables of the rule.
For instance, consider the constructor Π, with arity [(ty, 0), (ty, 1)]. In the rule
for Π formation (Example 3.12), we shall use two new symbols A, B, corresponding
to the arguments of Π in the premises of the rule. The classes and arities of these new
symbols are given by their classes and binders as arguments of Π: they are both type
symbols; the first one takes no arguments, and the second one takes one term argument.
Definition 3.21. The simple arity simp γ of a scope γ is the arity indexed by the
positions |γ|, and whose arguments all have syntactic class tm with no binding, i.e.,
simp γ := 〈(tm, 0) | i ∈ |γ|〉.
Definition 3.22. The metavariable extension Σ + α of Σ by arity α is the signature
indexed by ind Σ + argα, defined by
(Σ + α)ι0(S) := ΣS and (Σ + α)ι1(i) := (clα i, simp(bindα i)).
We usually treat the injection of symbols Σ→ Σ+α as an inclusion, writing S instead
of ι0(S); and for each i ∈ argα, we write metai for the corresponding new symbol
ι1(i) of Σ + α, the metavariable symbol for i.
Example 3.23. The symbol λ has arity [(ty, 0), (ty, 1), (tm, 1)]. It thus gives rise to the
metavariable extension Σ+[(ty, 0), (ty, 1), (tm, 1)], which adjoins to Σ three metavari-
able symbols meta0, meta1, meta2, which for readability we may rename to A, B, t,
with classes and arities (ty, []), (ty, [(tm, 0)]), and (tm, [(tm, 0)]) respectively. That is,
A and B are type symbols and t a term symbol, with the latter two each taking a term
argument. These will then appear in the rule for λ, to denote the arguments of a generic
instance of λ. We will often use more readable names for metavariable symbols, as
here, without further comment.
Let γ be a scope and metai(e) a raw expression over signature Σ+α and γ. Then e
is a map which assigns to each j ∈ |bindα i| an expression in ExprtmΣ+α(γ) because
γ ⊕ 0 = γ. Thus we may construe e as a raw substitution e : bindα i → γ. With
this in mind, the following definition explains how metavariables are replaced with
expressions.
Definition 3.24. Given a signature Σ, an arity α, and a scope γ, an instantiation I ∈
InstΣ,γ(α) of α in scope γ is a family of expressions Ii ∈ Exprcli αΣ (γ ⊕ bindi α),
for each i ∈ argα. Such an instantiation acts on expressions e ∈ ExprcΣ+α(δ) to give
expressions I∗e ∈ ExprcΣ(γ ⊕ δ), by replacing each occurrence of metai in e with a
copy of Ii, with the arguments of metai recursively substituted for the corresponding
variables in Ii:
I∗(metai(e)) := (γ ⊕ e)∗Ii,
I∗(varj) := varι1(j),
I∗(S(e)) := S (〈I∗ej〉j∈arg S).
We call I∗e the instantiation of e with I .
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Example 3.25. Anticipating Example 4.19, the rule for function application will be
written as follows, where for readability x stands for var0:
` A type x:A ` B(x) type ` s : Π(A,B(x)) ` t : A
` app(A,B(x), s, t) : B(t)
All expressions are in the metavariable extension Σ + αapp, where Σ is some am-
bient signature including Π and app, and αapp = [(ty, 0), (ty, 1), (tm, 0), (tm, 0)] as
in Example 3.9. The symbols A, B, s, t are the metavariable symbols of this exten-
sion. An instantiation of αapp in scope γ consists of expressions A ∈ ExprtyΣ(γ),
B ∈ ExprtyΣ(γ ⊕ 1), and s, t ∈ ExprtmΣ (γ). Instantiating the conclusion with these
expressions, over some context Γ, gives the judgement Γ ` app(A,B, s, t) : B[t/x].
Building on the above, instantiations also act on other objects built out of expres-
sions, including substitutions and other instantiations; at the same time, being them-
selves syntactic objects, instantiations are acted upon by substitutions and signature
maps; and all of these are suitably natural and functorial, as follows.
Definition 3.26. Given an instantiation I ∈ InstΣ,γ(α):
1. The instantiation I acts on a substitution f : δ′ → δ over Σ + α to give a
substitution I∗f : γ ⊕ δ′ → γ ⊕ δ, defined by
(I∗f)(inl i) := inl i (i ∈ γ),
(I∗f)(inr j) := I∗(fj) (j ∈ δ).
2. The instantiation I acts on an instantiation J ∈ InstΣ+α,δ(β) to give an in-
stantiation I∗J ∈ InstΣ,γ⊕δ(β), defined by (I∗J)j := I∗(Jj).
3. A substitution f : δ → γ over Σ acts on the instantiation I to give an instantia-
tion f∗I ∈ InstΣ,δ(α), defined by (f∗I)i := (f ⊕ bindα i)∗Ii.
4. The instantiation I is translated along a signature map F : Σ→ Σ′ to give an
instantiation F∗I ∈ InstΣ′,γ(α), defined by (F∗I)i := F∗(Ii).
Proposition 3.27. For all suitable instantiations I , J , signatures maps F , G, substitu-
tions f , g, arities α, expressions e, and scopes γ, δ, θ:
1. Translation along signature maps is functorial:
(G ◦ F )∗I = G∗(F∗I) and idΣ∗I = I.
2. The actions of substitutions and instantiations on expressions and on each other
are natural with respect to translation along signature maps:
F∗(I∗e) = (F∗I)∗((F + α)∗e),
F∗(I∗f) = (F∗I)∗((F + α)∗f),
F∗(I∗J) = (F∗I)∗((F + α)∗J),
F∗(f∗I) = (F∗f)∗(F∗I).
3. The action of substitutions on instantiations is functorial:
(f ◦ g)∗I = g∗(f∗I) and idγ∗I = I.
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4. The action of instantiations is natural with respect to substitutions:
(f∗I)∗e = (f ⊕ δ)∗(I∗e),
I∗(g∗e) = (I∗g)∗(I∗e).
5. The action of instantiations is “associative” in the sense that
(I∗J)∗e = I∗(J∗((ι0 + β)∗e))
holds modulo the canonical associativity isomorphism between the scopes (γ ⊕
δ)⊕ θ and γ ⊕ (δ ⊕ θ) of the left- and right-hand sides.
The above properties, while routine to prove, are a lot of boilerplate. They can be
incorporated, if desired, into the statement that syntax forms a scope-graded monad
on signatures in the sense of (Orchard et al., 2020), and that instantiations are certain
Kleisli maps for this monad. As ever, however, we emphasise in this paper the elemen-
tary viewpoint, rather than categorical abstraction.
4 Raw type theories
Having described raw syntax, we proceed with the formulation of raw type theories.
These hold enough information to prevent syntactic irregularities, and can be used
to specify derivations and derivability, but are qualified as “raw” because they allow
arbitrariness and abnormalities that are generally considered undesirable.
4.1 Raw contexts
Definition 4.1. A raw context Γ is a scope γ together with a family on ExprtyΣ(γ)
indexed by |γ|, i.e., a map |γ| → ExprtyΣ(γ). The positions of γ are also called the
variables of Γ. We often write just Γ for γ, e.g., i ∈ |Γ| instead of i ∈ |γ|, and
ExprcΣ(Γ) instead of Expr
c
Σ(γ). We use a subscript for the application of a context Γ
to a variable i, such that Γi is the type expression at index i.
This definition is somewhat non-traditional for dependent type theories, in a cou-
ple of ways. Contexts are more usually defined as lists, so their variables are or-
dered, and the type of each variable is assumed to depend only on earlier variables,
i.e. Ai ∈ ExprtyΣ(i). In our definition, the variables form an arbitrary scope, with no
order assumed; and each type may a priori depend on any variables of the context.
One may describe the two approaches as sequential and flat contexts, respectively.
The flat notion contains all the information needed when contexts are used in deriva-
tions; we view the sequentiality as extra information that may be provided later by a
derivation of well-formedness of a context, cf. Section 6.1, but that is not needed at the
raw level.
Example 4.2. With the de Bruijn index scope system, a raw context Γ of scope n may
be written as 〈Ai ∈ ExprtyΣ(n) | i ∈ |n|〉. A more familiar way to display Γ is as list
[(n − 1) : An−1, . . . , 0: A0], where each Ai ∈ ExprtyΣ(n), but as raw contexts follow
the flat approach, we should not think of this as imposing an order on the variables, and
hence the list [0 : A0, . . . , (n−1) : An−1] denotes the same context Γ. Note, by the way,
that at this stage contexts on de Bruijn indices are indistinguishable from contexts on
de Bruijn levels. The difference becomes apparent once we consider context extension,
and the scope coproduct inclusions come into play.
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Definition 4.3. Let Γ be a raw context, δ be a scope, and ∆ : |δ| → ExprtyΣ(|Γ| ⊕ δ)
a family of expressions indexed by |δ|. The context extension Γ .∆ is the raw context
of scope |Γ| ⊕ δ, defined as
(Γ .∆)inl j := (inl∗ ◦Γ)j and (Γ .∆)inr k := ∆k.
In other words, the extended raw context Γ .∆ is the map [inl∗ ◦Γ,∆] induced by the
universal property of the coproduct ||Γ| ⊕ δ|.
Example 4.4. To continue Example 4.2, we can consider how context extension works
for de Bruijn indices. Let Γ = [2: A2, 1: A1, 0: A0], where each Ai ∈ ExprtyΣ(3),
and ∆ = [1: B1, 0: B0] with Bj ∈ ExprtyΣ(3 + 2). The coproduct inclusions are
inl i = i+2 and inr j = j. The context Γ.∆ has scope 3+2 = 5, and is given by [(i 7→
i+2)∗ ◦ Γ,∆], which computes to [4 : inl∗A2, 3: inl∗A1, 2: inl∗A0, 1: B1, 0: B0].
The effect is that the variables from Γ are renamed according to the scope of ∆, and
the renaming acts on the associated type expressions accordingly, i.e., by shifting all
variables by 2.
Note that with raw contexts, we weaken types when extending a context. In ap-
proaches using sequential contexts with scoped syntax, weakening is instead performed
when types are taken out of a context: that is, the variable rule (precisely stated) con-
cludes Γ ` vari : ι∗Γi, where ι : i → n is the inclusion of an initial segment into the
full context.
In concrete examples, we will write contexts in a more traditional style, as lists of
variables names with their associated types:
x1 :A1, . . . , xn :An.
Like other syntactic objects, raw contexts are acted upon by signature maps and
instantiations. The functoriality and commutation properties for these actions follow
directly from the corresponding properties for expressions.
Definition 4.5. Given a signature map F : Σ → Σ′ and a raw context Γ over Σ,
the translation of Γ by F is the raw context F∗Γ over Σ′, with |F∗Γ| := |Γ| and
(F∗Γ)i := F∗Γi.
Proposition 4.6. The action of signature maps on raw contexts is functorial:
F∗(G∗Γ) = (F ◦G)∗Γ and idΣ∗Γ = Γ,
for all suitable F , G, Γ.
The action of instantiations is a little more subtle. Acting pointwise on the ex-
pressions of the context is not enough, since the instantiated expressions lie in a larger
scope. We need to supply extra types for the extra scope, i.e., the scope of the instanti-
ation must itself underlie a raw context.
Definition 4.7. An instantiation I in context Γ over Σ for arity α is an instantiation
I ∈ InstΣ,|Γ|(α). Then for any raw context ∆ over Σ + α, the context instantiation
(I,Γ)∗∆ is the context over Σ with scope |Γ| ⊕ |∆| and with type expressions
(I,Γ)∗∆inl(i) := inl
∗ Γi (i ∈ γ),
(I,Γ)∗∆inr(j) := I∗∆j (j ∈ δ).
Briefly, (I,Γ)∗∆ is the context extension of Γ by the instantiations of the types of
∆.
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Proposition 4.8. Given instantiations
I ∈ InstΣ,|Γ|(α) in context Γ,
K ∈ InstΣ+α,|∆|(β) in context ∆, and
Θ ∈ Inst(Σ+α)+β,|Θ|(γ) in context Θ,
the equation
(I,Γ)∗((K,∆)∗Θ) = (I∗K, (I,Γ)∗∆)∗Θ
holds modulo the canonical isomorphism between the scopes |Γ| ⊕ (|∆| ⊕ |Θ|) and
(|Γ| ⊕ |∆|)⊕ |Θ| of their right- and left-hand sides.
4.2 Judgements
Our type theories have four primitive judgement forms, following Martin-Löf (Martin-
Löf, 1984):
A type “A is a type”
t : A “term t has type A”
A ≡ B “A and B are equal as types”
s ≡ t : A “s and t are equal as terms of type A”
These are represented with symbols ty, tm, tyeq, and tmeq, respectively. For our
needs we need to describe the judgement forms quite precisely. In fact, the following
elaboration may seem a bit too precise, but we found it quite useful in the formalisation
to make explicit all the concepts involved and distinctions between them.
Each judgement form has a family of boundary slots and possibly a head slot,
where each slot has an associated syntactic class, as follows:
Form Boundary Head
ty [] ty
tm [ty] tm
tyeq [ty, ty]
tmeq [tm, tm, ty]
The table encodes the familiar constituent parts of the judgement forms:
1. “A type” has no boundary slots; the head slot, indicated by A, is a type.
2. “t : A” has one boundary type slot indicated by A, called the underlying type;
the head, indicated by t, is a term.
3. “A ≡ B” has two type slots indicated by A and B, called the left-hand side and
right-hand side; there is no head.
4. “s ≡ t : A” has two term slots indicated by s and t, and a type slot indicated
by A, called the left-hand side, the right-hand side and the underlying type,
respectively; there is no head.
The slots of a judgement form are the slots of its boundary, and the head, if present.
Definition 4.9. Given a raw context Γ and a judgement form φ, a hypothetical judge-
ment of that form over Γ is a map J taking each slot of φ of syntactic class c to an
element of ExprcΣ(Γ). We write Judg Σ for the set of all hypothetical judgements
18
over Σ. The types of Γ are the hypotheses and J is the thesis of the judgement. When
there is no ambiguity, we will (following traditional usage) speak of a judgment to
mean either a whole hypothetical judgement Γ ` J , or just a thesis J .
A hypothetical judgement is an object judgement if it is a term or a type judgement,
and an equality judgement if it is a type or a term equality judgement.
Example 4.10. The boundary and the head slots of the judgement form tm are [ty] and
tm, respectively. Thus a hypothetical judgement of this form over a raw context Γ is a
map taking the slot in the boundary to a type expression A ∈ ExprtyΣ(Γ) and the head
slot to a term expression t ∈ ExprtmΣ (Γ). This corresponds precisely to the information
conveyed by a traditional hypothetical term judgement “Γ ` t : A”.
In view of the preceding example we shall write a hypothetical judgement over Γ
given by a map J in the traditional type-theoretic way
Γ ` J
where the elements of J are displayed in the corresponding slots.
Just like raw contexts, judgements are acted on by signature maps and instantia-
tions.
Definition 4.11. Given a signature map F : Σ → Σ′ and a judgement Γ ` J over
Σ, the translation F∗(Γ ` J) is the judgement F∗Γ ` F∗J over Σ′ of the same form,
where the thesis F∗J is J with F∗ applied pointwise to each expression.
Proposition 4.12. This action is functorial: F∗(G∗(Γ ` J)) = (FG)∗(Γ ` J), and
(idΣ)∗(Γ ` J) = (Γ ` J), for all suitable F , G, Γ, J .
Definition 4.13. Given a signature Σ, a hypothetical judgement ∆ ` J over a metavari-
able extension Σ + α, a raw context Γ over Σ, and an instantiation I of α in context Γ,
the judgement instantiation (I,Γ)∗(∆ ` J) is the judgement Γ . I∗∆ ` I∗J over Σ,
where the thesis I∗J is just J with I∗ applied pointwise.
Proposition 4.14. Given instantiations
I ∈ InstΣ,|Γ|(α) in context Γ and
K ∈ InstΣ+α,|∆|(β) in context ∆,
and a judgement Θ ` J over (Σ + α) + β, the equation
(I,Γ)∗((K,∆)∗(Θ ` J)) = (I∗K, (I,Γ)∗∆)∗(Θ ` J)
holds modulo the canonical associativity renaming between their scopes.
4.3 Boundaries
In many places, one wants to consider data amounting to a hypothetical judgement
without a head expression (if it is of object form, and so should have a head). For
instance, a goal or obligation in a proof assistant is specified by such data; or when
adjoining a new well-formed rule to a type theory, before picking a fresh symbol for it
(if it is an object rule), the conclusion is specified by such data.
These entities crop up frequently, and seem almost as fundamental as judgements,
so deserve a name.
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Definition 4.15. Given a raw context Γ and a judgement form φ, a hypothetical bound-
ary of form φ over Γ is a map B taking each boundary slot of φ of syntactic class c to
an element of ExprcΣ(Γ).
We display boundaries as judgements with a hole  where the head should stand,
or with ≡? in place of ≡:
 type  : A A ≡? B s ≡? t : A
Since equality judgements have no heads, there is no difference in data between an
equality judgement and an equality boundary, but there is one of sense: the judgement
A ≡ B asserts an equality holds, whereas the boundary A ≡? B is a goal to be
established or postulated. Analogously,  type and  : A can be read as goals, the
former that a type be constructed, and the latter that A be inhabited.
The terminology about judgements, as well as many constructions, carry over to
boundaries. In particular, the action of signature maps and instantiations on bound-
aries is defined just as in Definitions 4.11 and 4.13, and enjoys analogous properties to
Propositions 4.12 and 4.14.
Finally, and crucially, boundaries can be completed to judgements. The data re-
quired depends on the form: completing an object boundary requires a head expression;
completing an equality boundary, just a change of view.
Definition 4.16. Let B be a boundary in scope γ over Σ.
1. If B is of object form, then given an expression e of the class of B in scope γ,
write B[e] for the completion of B with head e, a judgement over γ.
2. If B is of equality form, then the completion of B is just B itself, viewed as a
judgement.
Proposition 4.17. Completion of boundaries is natural with respect to signature maps:
F∗(B[e]) = (F∗B)[F∗e].
4.4 Raw rules
We now come to raw rules, syntactic entities that capture the notion of “templates”
that are traditionally used to display the inference rules of a type theory. The raw
rules include all the information needed in order to be used, for defining derivations
and derivability of judgements — but they do not yet include the extra properties we
typically check when considering rules, and which guarantee good properties of the
resulting derivability predicates. We return to these later, in Section 5.1.
Definition 4.18. A raw ruleR over a signature Σ consists of an arity αR, together with
a family of judgements over the extended signature Σ + αR, the premises of R, and
one more judgement over Σ + αR, the conclusion of R. An object rule is one whose
conclusion is an object judgement, otherwise it is an equality rule.
Example 4.19. Following on from Example 3.9, the raw rule for function application
has arity
αapp = [(ty, 0), (ty, 1), (tm, 0), (tm, 0)].
Writing A, B, s, t for the metavariable symbols of the extended signature Σ +αapp, the
premises of the rule are the four-element family:
[ ` A type, [0 : A] ` B(var0) type, ` s : Π(A,B(var0)), ` t : A ]
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and its conclusion is the hypothetical judgement
` app(A,B(var0), s, t) : B(t).
Of course, the traditional type-theoretic way of displaying such a rule is
` A type x:A ` B(x) type ` s : Π(A,B(x)) ` t : A
` app(A,B(x), s, t) : B(t)
It may seem surprising that we have B(x) and B(t) rather than, say, B and B[t/x],
since this style is usually apologised for as an abuse of notation. Here, it is precise and
formal; B is a metavariable symbol in Σ + αapp, so it is applied to arguments when
used in the syntax. Also note that the occurrences of x in the third premise and the
conclusion are implicitly bound by Π and app, as can be discerned from their arities.
When we instantiate the rule below with actual expressions A, B, s and t, then B(x)
and B(t) will be translated into B and B[t/x] respectively.
Definition 4.20. The functorial action of a signature map F : Σ → Σ′ is the map F∗
which takes a rule R over Σ to the rule F∗R over Σ′ whose arity is the arity αR of R,
and its premises and conclusion are those of R, all translated along the action of the
induced map F + αR : Σ + αR → Σ′ + αR.
A raw rule should not itself be thought of as a closure rule (though formally it is
one), but rather as a template specifying a whole family of closure rules.
Definition 4.21. Given a rule R, a raw context Γ, and an instantiation I of its arity αR
over Γ, all over a signature Σ, the instantiation of R under I , Γ, is the closure rule
(I,Γ)∗R on Judg Σ whose premises and conclusion are the instantiations of the corre-
sponding judgements of R under I , Γ. The closure system clR associated to R is the
family 〈(I,Γ)∗R | Γ ∈ Cxt Σ, I ∈ InstΣ,Γ(αR)〉 of all such instantiations.
Example 4.22. Continuing Example 4.19, the raw rule Rapp for application gives the
closure system cl(Rapp), containing for each raw context Γ (with scope γ) and expres-
sions A,B ∈ ExprtyΣ(γ), s, t ∈ ExprtmΣ (γ) a closure rule
Γ ` A type Γ, x:A ` B type Γ ` s : Π(A,B) Γ ` t : A
Γ ` app(A,B, s, t) : B[t/x].
This is visually similar to Rapp itself, but not to be confused with it. The instan-
tiation is a single closure rule, written over the ambient signature Σ; the original raw
rule, written over Σ + αapp, is a template specifying the whole family of such closure
rules. In the raw rule, A, B, s, t are metavariable symbols from the extended signature
Σ + αapp; in the instantiatiaion, the symbols A, B, s, t (note the difference in fonts)
are the actual syntactic expressions the raw rule was instantiated with.
This construction of cl formalises the usual informal explanation that a single writ-
ten rule is a shorthand for a scheme of closure conditions, with the quantification of the
scheme inferred from the written rule.
Proposition 4.23. The construction cl is laxly natural in signature maps, in that given
F : Σ → Σ′ and a rule R over Σ, there is an induced simple map of closure systems
clR→ clF∗R, over F∗ : Judg Σ→ Judg Σ′.
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Proof. For each instantiation I ∈ InstΣ,|Γ|(αR), we have F∗I ∈ InstΣ′,|Γ|(αR) and
(F∗I, F∗Γ)∗R = F∗((I,Γ)∗R).
This is lax in the sense that the resulting map clR→ clF∗R will not usually be an
isomorphism: in general, not every instantiation of αR over Σ′ is of the form F∗I . This
illustrates the need for considering raw rules formally, rather than just viewing a type
theory as a collection of closure rules: when translating a type theory between signa-
tures, we want not just the translations of the original closure rules, but all instantiations
of the translated raw rules.
One might hope for cl to be similarly laxly natural under instantiations. However,
this is not so straightforwardly true; we will return to this in Proposition 4.31, once the
structural rules are introduced, and show a weaker form of naturality.
4.5 Structural rules
The rules used in derivations over a type theory will fall into two groups:
1. the structural rules, governing generalities common to all type theories;
2. the specific rules of the particular type theory.
The structural rules over a signature Σ are a family of closure rules on Judg Σ,
which we now lay out. They are divided into four families:
• the variable rules,
• rules stating that equality is an equivalence relation,
• rules for conversion of terms and term equations between equal types, and
• rules for substitutions,
We have chosen the rules so that the development of the general setup requires no
hard meta-theorems, as far as possible. In particular, we include the substitution rules
into the formalism so that we can postpone proving elimination of substitution until
Section 5.4. You might have expected to see congruence rules among the structural
rules, but those we take care of separately in Section 4.6 because they depend on the
specific rules.
The first three families of structural rules are straightforward.
Definition 4.24. For each raw context Γ over a signature Σ, and for each i ∈ |Γ|, the
corresponding variable rule is the closure rule
Γ ` Γi type
Γ ` vari : Γi
Taken together, the variable rules form a family indexed by such pairs (Γ, i).
While this had to be given directly as a family of closure rules, the next two groups
of structural rules can be expressed as raw rules.
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Definition 4.25. The raw equivalence relation rules are the following raw rules:
` A type
` A ≡ A
` A type ` B type ` A ≡ B
` B ≡ A
` A type ` B type ` C type ` A ≡ B ` B ≡ C
` A ≡ C
` A type ` s : A
` s ≡ s : A
` A type ` s : A ` t : A ` s ≡ t : A
` t ≡ s : A
` A type ` s : A ` t : A ` u : A ` s ≡ t : A ` t ≡ u : A
` s ≡ u : A
The equivalence relation rules over Σ is the sum of the closure systems associated to
the above equivalence relation rules, over a given signature Σ.
We trust the reader to be able read off the arities of the metavariable symbols ap-
pearing in raw rules. For instance, from the use of A and s in the above term reflexivity
rule we can tell that the rule has arity [(ty, 0), (tm, 0)].
The conversion rules are written as raw rules, as well.
Definition 4.26. The raw conversion rules are the following raw rules:
` A type ` B type ` s : A ` A ≡ B
` s : B
` A type ` B type ` s : A ` t : A ` s ≡ t : A ` A ≡ B
` s ≡ t : B
Again, the conversion rules over Σ is the sum of the closure systems associated to the
above conversion rules, over a signature Σ.
The remaining groups are the substitution and equality-substitution rules.
The substitution rule should formalize the notion that “well-typed” substitutions
preserve derivability of judgements. Treatments taking simultaneous substitution as
primitive usually say something like: a raw substitution f : ∆ → Γ is well-typed if
∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi for each i ∈ |Γ|. However, taking all these judgements as premises in
the substitution rule is rather profligate: most substitutions in practice act non-trivially
only on a small part of the context. For instance, a single-variable substitution may be
represented as a raw substitution Γ→ Γ .A acting trivially on Γ, so no checking should
be required there. Indeed, in treatments taking single-variable substitution as primitive,
only require checking of the substituted expression. To abstract this situation, we define
the substitution rule as follows. Recall that a subset X ⊆ Y is complemented when
X ∪ (Y \X) = Y , a condition that is vacuously true in classical logic.
Definition 4.27. A raw substitution f : ∆ → Γ acts trivially at i ∈ |Γ| when there
is some (necessarily unique) j ∈ |∆| such that f(i) = varj and ∆j = f∗Γi. Given a
complemented subsetK ⊆ |Γ| on which f acts trivially, the corresponding substitution
rule is the closure rule
Γ ` J
for each i ∈ |Γ| \K: ∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi
∆ ` f∗J (4.1)
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The substitution rules form a family of closure rules, indexed by f : ∆ → Γ, K, and
Γ ` J .
In the above definition,K is thought of as a set of positions at which f is guaranteed to
act trivially, but it may also do so outside K, as there is no harm in checking positions
at which f acts trivially.
The substitution rules are formulated carefully for another, more technical reason.
In inductions over derivations (e.g. for Lemma 5.20), when a substitution descends
under a binder, it gets extended to act trivially on the variables introduced by the binder.
Within the inductive cases, we may not yet have enough information to conclude that
the types of the bound variables are well-formed, but we can rely on the trivial action
of the substitution. Keeping substitution rules flexible and economical in this way
therefore keeps these inductive proofs much cleaner.
Along similar lines, we have rules stating that substitution of equal terms gives
equal results.
Definition 4.28. Raw substitutions f, g : ∆ → Γ act jointly trivially at i ∈ |Γ| when
there is some (necessarily unique) j ∈ |∆| such that f(i) = g(i) = varj and ∆j =
f∗Γi = g∗Γi. Given a complemented subset K ⊆ |Γ| on which f and g act jointly
trivially, the corresponding equality-substitution rules are the closure rules
Γ ` A type
for each i ∈ |Γ| \K:
∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi ∆ ` g(i) : g∗Γi ∆ ` f(i) ≡ g(i) : f∗Γi
∆ ` f∗A ≡ g∗A
Γ ` t : A
for each i ∈ |Γ| \K:
∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi ∆ ` g(i) : g∗Γi ∆ ` f(i) ≡ g(i) : f∗Γi
∆ ` f∗t ≡ g∗t : f∗A
The equality-substitution rules form a family of closure rules, indexed by f : ∆ → Γ,
K, and either Γ ` A type or Γ ` t : A.
Definition 4.29. The structural rules over Σ, denoted Struct Σ, is the sum of the
families of closure rules set out above: the variable, equivalence relation, conversion,
substitution, and equality-substitution rules.
Proposition 4.30. Given a signature map F : Σ→ Σ′, there is a simple map of closure
systems Struct Σ→ Struct Σ′ over F∗ : Judg Σ→ Judg Σ′.
Proof. This is straightforward, amounting to checking that for each instance of a struc-
tural rule over Σ, F acts on the data to give an instance of the same structural rule over
Σ′, and the resulting closure condition is the translation along F∗ of the original closure
condition over Σ.
Before giving a similar statement about instantiations of structural rules, we must
first tie up the loose end from above about instantiation of closure systems of raw rules.
Proposition 4.31. Let R be a raw rule over Σ, R + β its translation to an extension
Σ + β, and I an instantiation of β in some context Γ. Then there is a closure system
map cl(R+ β)→ clR+ Struct Σ, over (I,Γ)∗ : Judg (Σ + β)→ Judg Σ.
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Proof. We need to show that for each instantiation K ∈ InstΣ+β,|∆|(αR) in some
context ∆, the closure condition I∗((K,Γ)∗R) is derivable from clR+ Struct Σ.
Given such K and Γ, we can instantiate both under I to get an instantiation of R
over Σ. We might hope that (I∗K, I∗Γ)∗R = I∗ ((K,Γ)∗(R+ β); by Proposition 4.14,
we see that this does not strictly, but only up to an associativity renaming in each judge-
ment.
The substitution structural rule comes to our rescue here. For each judgement J
involved in R, with context Θ, the associativity renamings give substitutions between
I∗(K∗Θ) and (I∗K)∗Θ acting trivially at every position, so the substitution rule lets
us derive I∗(K∗J) from (I∗K)∗J (with no further premises), and vice versa.
The desired derivation of I∗ ((K,Γ)∗(R+ β) from clR+ Struct Σ therefore con-
sists of (I∗K, I∗Γ)∗R, together with an instance of the substitution rule after the con-
clusion and before each premise, implementing the associativity renamings.
Proposition 4.32. Let I ∈ InstΣ,|Γ|(α) be an instantiation in context Γ. Then there
is a closure system map Struct(Σ + α) → Struct Σ, over (I,Γ)∗ : Judg (Σ + α) →
Judg Σ.
Proof. For the structural rules given as raw rules, the required derivations are given by
Proposition 4.31.
For the other structural rules, we start as in Proposition 4.30. Given an instance
of a structural rule over Σ + α, we instantiate its data under I to get an instance of
the same structural rule over Σ. Wrapping this instance in associativity renamings,
derived by the substitution rule as in Proposition 4.31, gives the required derivation of
the instantiation of the original instance.
4.6 Congruence rules
Congruence rules, which state that judgemental equality commutes with type and term
symbols, are peculiar enough to demand special attention.
They are present in almost all type theories, but rarely explicitly written out, and are
often classified as structural rules. We reserve that term for the rules of the preceding
section, which are independent of the specific theory under consideration. Congruence
rules, by contrast, depend on the specific rules of a theory; for instance, the congruence
rule for Π is determined by the formation rule for Π.
In this section we define how any object rule determines an associated congruence
rule. We first set up an auxiliary definition, associating equality judgements to object
judgements.
Definition 4.33. For signature maps `, r : Σ→ Σ′ and an object judgement J over Σ,
we define the equality judgment (`, r)∗J over Σ′ by
(`, r)∗(Γ ` A type) := (`∗Γ ` `∗A ≡ r∗A),
(`, r)∗(Γ ` t : A) := (`∗Γ ` `∗t ≡ r∗t : `∗A).
Definition 4.34. Suppose R is a raw object rule over a signature Σ, with premises
〈Pi | i ∈ I〉 and conclusion C. Let φi be the judgement form of Pi, and take Iob :=
{i ∈ I | φi ∈ {ty, tm}}, the set of object premises of R. The associated congruence
rule R≡ is a raw rule with arity αR≡ := αR + αR, defined as follows, where `, r :
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Σ + αR → Σ + αR≡ are signature maps
`(ι0(S)) := ι0(S), r(ι0(S)) := ι0(S),
`(ι1(M)) := ι1(ι0(M)), r(ι1(M)) := ι1(ι1(M)) :
1. The premises of R≡ are indexed by the set I + I + Iob, and are given by:
(a) the ι0(i)-th premise is `∗Pi,
(b) the ι1(j)-th premise is r∗Pj ,
(c) the ι2(k)-th premise is the equality (`, r)∗Pk, cf. Definition 4.33.
2. The conclusion of R≡ is (`, r)∗C.
Example 4.35. Definition 4.34 works as expected. For example, the congruence rule
associated with the usual product formation rule
` A type x:A ` B(x) type
` Π(A,B(x)) type
comes out to be
` A′ type x:A′ ` B′(x) type
` A′′ type x:A′′ ` B′′(x) type
` A′ ≡ A′′ x:A′ ` B′(x) ≡ B′′(x)
` Π(A′,B′′(x)) ≡ Π(A′′,B′′(x))
4.7 Raw type theories
After a considerable amount of preparation, we are finally in position to formulate what
a rudimentary general type theory is.
Definition 4.36. A raw type theory T over a signature Σ is a family of raw rules over Σ.
Definition 4.37. The associated closure system of a raw type theory T over Σ is the
closure system clT := Struct Σ +
∐
R∈T clR on Judg Σ; that is, it consists of the
structural rules for Σ, and the closure rules generated by the instantiations of the rules
of T . A derivation in T is a derivation over the closure system clT , in the sense of
Definition 2.8.
Note that we have not included the congruence rules into the closure system as-
sociated with a raw type theory. Instead, the presence of congruence rules will be
required separately as a well-behavedness condition in Section 5.2. Derivability and
admissibility of rules may now be defined as follows.
Definition 4.38. Let T be a raw type theory over Σ, and R a raw rule over Σ.
1. R is derivable from T if its conclusion is derivable from its premises, over T +
αR.
2. R is admissible for T if for every instance (I,Γ)∗R, its conclusion is derivable
if its premises are derivable, all over T .
We record the basic category-theoretic structure of raw type theories.
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Definition 4.39. Given a signature map F : Σ→ Σ′, and raw type theories T , T ′ over
Σ and Σ′ respectively, a simple map F¯ : T → T ′ over F is a family map T → T ′
over F∗ : RawRule Σ → RawRule Σ′. Such F¯ is thus a map giving for each rule R
of T a rule F¯ (R) of T ′, whose premises and conclusion are the translations along F of
those of R. There are evident identity simple maps, and composites over composites
of signature maps, forming a category over the category of signatures.
Furthermore, a signature map F : Σ → Σ′ acts on a raw type theory T over Σ,
to give a raw type theory F∗(T ) over Σ′, which consists of the translations F∗R of the
rules R of T . As with family maps, maps T → T ′ over F correspond precisely to
maps F∗T → T ′ over idΣ′ . In the case of the inclusion to a metavariable extension
ι0 : Σ→ Σ + α, we write T + α for the translation ι0∗T of T to Σ + α.
Proposition 4.40. The construction cl is functorial in simple maps: a simple map of
raw type theories F¯ : T → T ′ over F : Σ → Σ′ induces a map F¯∗ : clT → clT ′
over F∗ : Judg Σ→ Judg Σ′, and hence provides a translation of any derivation D ∈
DerT (H, (Γ ` J)) to a derivation F¯∗D ∈ DerT ′(F∗H, (F∗Γ ` F∗J)).
Proof. Direct from the functoriality and naturality properties of structural rules (Propo-
sition 4.30) and of the closure systems associated to raw rules (Proposition 4.23).
Corollary 4.41. A signature map F : Σ→ Σ′ acts on D ∈ DerT (H, (Γ ` J)) to give
a derivation F∗D ∈ DerF∗T (F∗H,F∗(Γ ` J)), functorially so.
Proof. By Proposition 4.40, using the canonical simple map T → F∗T over F .
We use the previously corollary quite frequently to translate a derivation over a raw
type theory to its extension. We mostly leave such applications implicit, as they are
easily detected.
Instantiations also preserve derivability, but this is a significantly more involved
construction — more so than one might expect — bringing together many earlier con-
structions and lemmas, and relying in particular on almost all the properties of Propo-
sition 3.27.
Proposition 4.42. Given a raw type theory T over Σ, an instantiation I ∈ InstΣ,Γ(α)
induces a closure system map (I,Γ)∗ : clT + α→ clT over (I,Γ)∗ : Judg Σ + α→
Judg Σ, where T + α is the translation of T by the inclusion Σ→ Σ + α.
Proof. Again, direct from similar properties of structural rules (Proposition 4.32) and
closure systems of raw rules (Proposition 4.31).
Corollary 4.43. Let T be a raw type theory over Σ. An instantiation I ∈ InstΣ,Γ(α)
acts on a derivation D ∈ DerT+α(H, (∆ ` J)) to give the instantiation (I,Γ)∗D ∈
DerT ((I,Γ)∗H, I∗(∆ ` J)).
Note that the hypotheses H and the judgement ∆ ` J in the statement reside in the
translation T + α by the inclusion Σ→ Σ + α.
4.8 Summary
Raw type theories give a conceptually minimal way to make precise what is meant by
traditional specifications of type theories, and a similarly minimal amount of data from
which to define derivability on judgements.
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As the name suggests, raw type theories are not a finished product. Type theories
in nature almost always satisfy further well-formedness properties, and are rejected
by audiences if they do not. In the next two sections, we will discuss these well-
formedness properties.
In some ways, raw type theories may therefore be viewed as an unnatural or un-
desirable notion. However, most of the well-behavedness properties — or rather, the
conditions on rules implying well-behavedness — themselves involve checking deriv-
ability of certain judgements. So raw type theories, as the minimal data for defining
derivability, give a natural intermediate stage on the way to our main definition of “rea-
sonable” type theories.
5 Well-behavedness properties
In this section we identify easily-checked syntactic properties of the rules specifying a
type theory, and prove basic fitness-for-purpose meta-theorems, which together articu-
late the rules-of-thumb that researchers habitually use to verify that some collection of
inference rules defines a “reasonable” type theory.
5.1 Acceptable rules
Not all raw rules are deemed reasonable from a type-theoretic point of view. But what
standard of “reasonable” are we aiming to delineate? Essentially, the same as for the
axioms of a theory in first-order logic: the axioms must be well-formed enough to be
given some meaning, although that meaning may be “false”, “wrong”, or otherwise
unexpected.
Consider for instance the following possible modifications of the rule for app, all
written as raw rules:
` A type x:A ` B(x) type ` f : Π(A,B(x)) ` a : A
` app(A,B(x), f, a) : B(a) (5.1)
` A type x:A ` B(x) type ` f : A ` a : A
` app(A,B(x), f, a) : B(a) (5.2)
` A type x:A ` B(x) type ` f : Π(A,B(x)) ` a : Π(A,B(x))
` app(A,B(x), f, a) : B(a) (5.3)
The first is the usual rule for app, and should certainly be considered acceptable.
The second asks the argument f to be of type A. This is “wrong” under the usual
reading of Π and app, but not entirely meaningless: one can introduce app with this
typing rule, and obtain a well-behaved (if bizarre) type theory. So this should be ac-
cepted as a type-theoretic rule.
The third asks the argument a to be of type Π(A,B(x)). This is “not even wrong”:
the conclusion purports to introduce a term of type B(a), but that is not a well-formed
type, since B expects an argument of type A, so a is not suitable (at least in the ab-
sence of other rules implying that ` A ≡ Π(A,B(x))). This will therefore not be an
acceptable rule.
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Another unacceptable rule would be:
` A type
x:A ` B(x) type ` f : Π(A,B(x)) ` a : A ` a : Π(A,B(x))
` app(A,B(x), f, a) : B(a) (5.4)
This is again clearly nonsense: it introduces a twice, with two different types.
There are rules which are not uncommon in practice, but which we will not accept
directly, such as:
` f : Π(A,B(x)) ` a : A
` app(A,B(x), f, a) : B(a) (5.5)
While the rule is completely reasonable, making sense of it is rather subtle: check-
ing, for instance, that B(a) in the conclusion is well-formed requires applying some
kind of inversion principle, to the type Π(A,B(x)) from the premises. Whether such
an inversion principle is available depends on the particularities of the type theory un-
der consideration. In general, we want acceptable rules to be more straightforwardly
and robustly well-behaved, so we expect that every metavariable used by the rule is
explicitly introduced by some (unique) premise.
Finally, some rules have variant forms given by moving simple premises into the
context of the conclusion. For example, the rule for application is sometimes given as
` A type x:A ` B(x) type
x:A, y :Π(A,B(x)) ` app(A,B(x), y, x) : B(x) (5.6)
This variant has been called the hypothetical form, in contrast to the universal
form (5.1). With substitution included as a structural rule, the two forms are equiv-
alent: each is derivable from the other. In the absence of a substitution rule, they are
not equivalent; the hypothetical form is too weak. We have also heard it argued that
the universal form should be seen as conceptually prior. So both forms are arguably
reasonable; but the universal form (5.1), with empty conclusion context, has the clearer
claim, and no generality is lost by restricting to such forms.
Summarising the above discussion, there are several simple syntactic criteria com-
monly used as rules-of-thumb to determine “reasonability” of rules. We now formally
define these criteria, and collect them into a definition of acceptability of rules.
Definition 5.1. Suppose R is a raw rule with arity αR over a signature Σ. We say that
R is tight when there exists a bijection β between the arguments of αR and the object
premises of R, such that for each argument i of αR,
1. the context of the premise β(i) has the scope bindαR i;
2. the judgement form of the premise β(i) is clαR i;
3. the head expression of the premise β(i) is metai(〈varj〉j∈bindαR i).
Note that the bijection β is unique, if it exists. The definition of tightness is ad-
mittedly a bit technical, but it captures a well-formedness condition of rules which
is familiar but infrequently discussed explicitly. Namely, a rule is tight if its object
premises provide the “typing” of its metavariable symbols.
Tightness alone does not suffice to make a rule reasonable, e.g., the rule (5.3) is
tight but still broken because the type expression B(a) is senseless. We need another
condition which ensures that the type and term expressions appearing in the rule make
sense.
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Definition 5.2. To each judgement Γ ` J , we associate the family of presuppositions
Presup (Γ ` J), defined as the judgements formed over Γ by placing the boundary
slots of J in the head position as follows:
Presup (Γ ` A type) := [ ],
Presup (Γ ` s : A) := [Γ ` A type],
Presup (Γ ` A ≡ B) := [Γ ` A type,Γ ` B type],
Presup (Γ ` s ≡ t : A) := [Γ ` A type,Γ ` s : A,Γ ` t : A].
We shall need to know later on that presuppositions are natural with respect to the
action of signature maps, instantiations, and raw substitutions.
Proposition 5.3. Let Γ ` J be a judgement over Σ, and F : Σ→ Σ′ a signature map.
Then Presup (F∗Γ ` F∗J) = F∗(Presup (Γ ` J)).
Proof. This is clear, for instance the presupposition of F∗Γ ` F∗s : F∗A is F∗Γ `
F∗A type, which is precisely what we get when F acts on Γ ` A type, the presuppo-
sition of Γ ` s : A.
The reasoning that established the analogous statements about the actions of in-
stantiations and raw substitutions is similarly easy.
Proposition 5.4. Let Γ ` J be a judgement over a metavariable extension Σ + α and
I ∈ InstΣ,γ(α) an instantiation. Then Presup (I∗Γ ` I∗J) = I∗(Presup (Γ ` J)).
Proposition 5.5. Let Γ ` J be a judgement and f : ∆→ Γ a raw substitution. Every
presupposition of ∆ ` f∗J has the form ∆ ` f∗J ′, where Γ ` J ′ is a presupposition
of Γ ` J ′.
There is a weaker and a stronger condition that we can impose on a rule with regards
to the presuppositions of its conclusion.
Definition 5.6. Let T be a raw type theory over a signature Σ and R a raw rule over Σ:
1. a raw rule R is weakly presuppositive over T when every presupposition of the
conclusion ofR is derivable in T (translated from Σ to Σ+αR) from the premises
of R and the presuppositions of the premises of R,
2. a raw ruleR is presuppositive over T when all presuppositions of the conclusion
and of the premises of R are derivable in T (translated from Σ to Σ + αR) from
the premises of R.
As far as derivability is concerned, weakly presuppositive rules are good enough,
for a rule cannot be applied unless its premises have already been derived, in which
case their presuppositions will be derivable as well — which is the gist of the proof
of Theorem 5.15. However, if we were to give a meaning to a raw rule on its own,
we would be hard-pressed to explain what the premises are about, unless their presup-
positions were derivable as well, hence we take the stronger variant as the standard
one.
Definition 5.7. A raw rule R is acceptable for a raw type theory T if it is tight, pre-
suppositive over T , and has empty conclusion context.
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Example 5.8.
1. The above rules (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), and (5.6) are tight.
2. The above rules (5.1), (5.2), (5.4), and (5.6) are presuppositive.
3. The rule
` A type
which allows us to infer that every type expression is a type, is not tight.
4. If S is a type symbol with the empty arity, the rule
` S() type
is presuppositive and tight.
5. Symmetry of type equality comes in two versions:
` A ≡ B
` B ≡ A
` A type ` B type ` A ≡ B
` B ≡ A
The left-hand one is not tight and is presuppositive, and the right-hand one is
tight and presuppositive.
Proposition 5.9. The congruence rule associated to an acceptable object rule is ac-
ceptable.
Proof. Let R be a tight and presuppositive raw object rule over a raw type theory T
with premises 〈Γi ` Ji | i ∈ I〉. There exists a bijection βR between object premises
of R and the arguments of αR.
Definition 4.34 lays out the associated congruence rule R≡. Its arity is αR≡ =
αR + αR and its premises are indexed by I + I + Iob, where Iob is the set of object
premises of R. The bijection βR≡ witnessing tightness of R≡ is given by
βR≡(ι0(i)) := ι0(βR(i)) and βR≡(ι1(j)) := ι1(βR(j)).
Let us verify that the properties for tightness of R≡ required in Definition 5.1 follow
directly from the tightness of R. For any ι0(i) ∈ argαR≡ :
(1) The context of the premise βR≡(ι0(i)) = ι0(βR(i)) is `∗Γi. The signature
map ` : Σ + αR → Σ + αR≡ does not change the underlying scope of Γi,
and thus `∗Γi has the same underlying scope as Γi, which equals bindαR i be-
cause R is tight. Furthermore, bindαR i = bindαR≡ (ι0(i)), as required.
(2) The premise βR≡(ι0(i)) has judgement form clαR≡ ι0(i) by the analogous rea-
soning.
(3) The head of the premise βR≡(ιi(i)) is `∗e where e = metai(〈varj〉j∈bindαR i)
by tightness of R. We need to show that `∗e = metaι0(i)(〈varj〉j∈bindαR≡ ι0(i)),
but this equation holds by the definitions of ` and of αR≡ .
The case of ι1(j) ∈ argαR≡ is symmetric.
We also need to show that all presuppositions of the premises and the conclusion
of R≡ are derivable in TR≡ from the premises of R≡, where TR≡ = ι0∗ ◦ T is the
translation of T along ι0 : Σ→ Σ + αR≡ .
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Consider the premise Γι0(i) ` Jι0(i) at index ι0(i) for some i ∈ I . By Propo-
sition 5.3, a presupposition of this premise is a presupposition P = (Γi ` J ′) of
the corresponding premise in R, translated along the signature map `. By presuppos-
itivity of R, the judgement P is derivable from TR = ι0∗ ◦ T , the translation of T
along ι0 : Σ → Σ + αR. By Corollary 4.41, we can translate such a derivation of P
along `∗, yielding a derivation in T ′ = `∗ ◦ TR, where T ′ is TR translated along `. But
T ′ = `∗ ◦ TR = `∗ ◦ ι0∗ ◦ T = ι0∗T = TR≡ , so we obtain a derivation in the correct
theory.
The case of a premise indexed by ι1(j) with j ∈ I is similar, but the last step
requires translation along the signature map r = idΣ+αR + ι1 instead, mapping the
metavariable symbols of αR to the right-hand side metavariables of R≡.
A premise P indexed by ι2(k) is an equality associated to the k-th object premise
ofR. The presuppositions of P are derived by the corresponding object premises ι0(k)
and ι1(k), and in the case of a term equation, the presupposition of the left-hand side.
A presupposition of the conclusion is derivable by appeal to the ruleR itself for left
and right hand side of the equation. In case R≡ is a term equation, the type judgement
arising as presupposition of the conclusion of R is derivable in TR by presuppositivity
of R, and can be translated along `∗ in the same way that we treated the left-hand
copies of the premises.
Proposition 5.10. The raw structural rules, i.e., the equivalence relation rules and the
conversion rules are acceptable for any type theory.
Proof. Tightness is obvious. Presuppositivity is obvious for all but the conclusion of
the equality conversion rule ` s ≡ t : B, which immediately follows from the ordinary
conversion rule for term judgements.
5.2 Acceptable type theories
It may happen that a raw type theory is flawed, even though each of its rules is accept-
able. For instance, we might simply forget to state a rule governing one of the symbols,
or provide two contradicting rules for the same symbol. Thus we also need a notion of
acceptability of a raw type theory.
Definition 5.11. Suppose Σ is a signature and S ∈ Σ has arity αS . The generic
application of S is the expression
Ŝ := S(〈metai(〈varj〉j∈bindαS i)〉i∈argαS ).
We say that an inference rule R is a symbol rule for S when its arity is αS , the judge-
ment form of the conclusion is the syntactic class of S, and its head is Ŝ.
Definition 5.12. A raw type theory T over Σ is:
1. tight if its rules are tight and there is a bijection β from the index set of Σ to the
object rules of T such that, for every symbol S of Σ, β(S) is a symbol rule for S;
2. presuppositive if all of its rules are presuppositive over T ;
3. substitutive if all its rules have empty conclusion context; and
4. congruous if for every object rule of T the associated congruence rule (cf. Defi-
nition 4.34) is a rule of T .
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A raw type theory is acceptable if it enjoys all of these properties.
The definition omits a common criterion for being “reasonable”, namely there be-
ing a well-founded order that prevents cyclic references between parts of the theory.
We address well-foundedness separately in Section 6, and provide a couple of exam-
ples showing how cyclic references may appear in an acceptable type theory.
Example 5.13. Let Q be a quantifier-like type symbol which takes a type and a term,
and binds one variable in the term, with the raw rule
` A type var0 :Q(A, t(var0)) ` t(var0) : A
` Q(A, t(var0)) type
The context in the second premise is not cyclic because Q binds var0, but the premise
itself is cyclic because the term metavariable t is introduced in a context that mentions
it, and the rule is only presuppositive thanks to itself. Even so, the rule can still be used
to derive judgements. For example, for any ` t : A we can form the type Q(A, t). It
is not clear what one would do with such rules, but we have no reason to banish them
outright.
Example 5.14. The second example of cyclic references is a Tarski-style universe that
contains itself, formulated as follows. Let u be a term constant and El a type symbol
taking one term argument, with the raw rules
` u : El(u)
` a : El(u)
` El(a) type
Think of u as the code of the universe El(u) that contains itself, and El as the con-
structor taking codes to types. The rules themselves are not cyclic, and the type theory
comprising them and the associated congruence rules is acceptable. However, in order
to derive ` El(u) type, which is a presupposition for both rules, we need both rules. In
this case the cycles can be broken easily enough: introduce a type constant ` U type
and the equation ` U ≡ El(u), then use U in place of El(u) in the above rules. In Sec-
tion 6.5 we shall provide a general method for removing cyclic dependencies between
rules by introduction of new symbols.
5.3 Derivability of presuppositions
Our first meta-theorem is a fairly easy one, giving a property that is always desired but
not often explicitly discussed.
Theorem 5.15 (Presuppositions theorem). Let T be a raw type theory with all rules
weakly presuppositive. If a judgement is derivable over T , then so are all its presuppo-
sitions.
Proof. We proceed by induction on derivations D over T .
If D ends with a variable rule (Definition 4.24), then the only presupposition ap-
pears directly as the premise of the rule, so we may re-use its subderivation.
If D ends with a substitution rule (Definition 4.27), then its conclusion must be
∆ ` f∗J for some substitution f : ∆→ Γ and judgement Γ ` J . By Proposition 5.5,
each presupposition of the conclusion is ∆ ` f∗J ′ for some presupposition Γ ` J ′
of Γ ` J . But Γ ` J is a premise of the last rule of D, so by induction we have a
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derivation D′ of Γ ` J ′. So we can apply the substitution rule with Γ ` J ′ (derived by
D′) and the same substitution f (with its premises derived as in D) to get the desired
derivation of ∆ ` f∗J ′.
Similarly, ifD ends with an equality substitution rule (Definition 4.28), substituting
an pair f, g : ∆ → Γ into a judgement Γ ` J , each presupposition of the conclusion
can be derived by either a substitution (along f or g individually) or an equality substi-
tution (along f, g) into some presupposition of Γ ` J .
The equivalence and conversion rules (Definitions 4.25 and 4.26) are presuppositive
by Proposition 5.10, so we treat them together with the specific raw rules of T .
If D ends with an instance (I,Γ)∗R of a raw rule R (either specific or structural),
then its conclusion is of the form (I,Γ)∗∆ ` I∗J , where ∆ ` J is the conclusion
of R. Now Proposition 5.4 tells us that each presupposition of the conclusion is an
instantiation (I,Γ)∗∆ ` I∗J ′ of some presupposition ∆ ` J ′ of ∆ ` J . Since
R is weakly presuppositive, ∆ ` J ′ is derivable from the premises of R plus their
presuppositions. So by Corollary 4.43, (I,Γ)∗∆ ` I∗J ′ is derivable from the premises
of (I,Γ)∗R plus their presuppositions, which in turn are derivable by induction.
5.4 Elimination of substitution
In this section we show that over an acceptable type theory, the substitution rules (Def-
initions 4.27 and 4.28) can be eliminated: anything derivable with them is derivable
without. At least, this will hold over a strict scope system; for a general scope system,
it can be almost eliminated but not quite entirely.
Definition 5.16. An instance of the substitution rule (Definition 4.27) is a trivial re-
naming, or just trivial, if its substitution f : ∆ → Γ corresponds to a renaming on
underlying scopes of the form inl−1 : |Γ| = |∆| ⊕ 0 → |∆|, acting trivially at all
positions.
Typically these arise with Γ = (I,∆)∗[ ], an instantiation of the empty context; a
trivial renaming is therefore of the form
(I,∆)∗[ ] ` J
∆ ` (inl−1)∗J.
In a strict scope system, trivial renamings are identities and hence redundant.
To avoid ambiguity with variance, we will in this section distinguish more carefully
than usual between a renaming function r : |Γ| → |∆| and its associated substitution
r¯ : ∆→ Γ.
Definition 5.17. Call a derivation over a raw type theory T substitution-free if it uses
only trivial instances of the substitution rule, and does not use the equality substitution
rule. Equivalently, it uses just the variable rule, equality rules, conversion rules, trivial
renamings, and the specific rules of T .
The core of this section, Lemma 5.20, will be that substitution is admissible for
substitution-free derivations; this can be seen as defining an action of substitution on
such derivations. We first need an analogous action of renaming, paralleling how sub-
stitution on expressions needed renaming to be defined first.
Lemma 5.18 (Admissibility of renaming). Let T be a substitutive type theory, with
signature Σ. Let Γ and Γ′ be contexts over Σ, and r : |Γ| → |Γ′| a renaming acting
34
trivially at all positions in the sense of Definition 4.27, i.e. such that Γ′r(i) = r∗Γi
for all i ∈ Γ. Then given a substitution-free derivation D of Γ ` J in T , there is a
substitution-free derivation r∗D of Γ′ ` r∗J .
Proof. For this proof, we say a renaming respects types when it acts trivially at all
positions; and say a derivation D with conclusion Γ ` J is renameable if we have
an operation giving, for every Γ′ and renaming r : |Γ| → |Γ′| respecting types, a
derivation r∗D of Γ′ ` r∗J .
We show by induction that every derivation is renameable. Call the derivation under
consideration D, and suppose given in each case suitable Γ′, r.
If D concludes with a variable rule, giving Γ ` vari : Γi, then by induction, we can
rename the derivation of the premise Γ ` Γi type to a derivation of Γ′ ` Γ′r(i) type,
and then apply the variable rule to derive Γ′ ` varr(i) : Γ′r(i), which is the desired
judgement since r respects types.
IfD concludes with a trivial renaming s : Γ→ ∆, then by induction, the derivation
of the premise is renameable; so renaming it along r ◦ s, we are done.
Otherwise, D concludes with an instantiation (I,Θ)∗R, where I ∈ InstΣ,Θ(αR)
is an instantiation, and R is either an equality rule, a conversion rule, or a specific rule
of T . In each cases the conclusion of R is of the form ` J ′, with empty context; so
Γ is exactly (I,Θ)∗[ ], and J is has the form I∗J ′. So now to derive Γ′ ` r∗(I∗J ′),
we will apply the same raw rule R with the instantiation I ′ := (r ◦ inl)∗I . Computing
with renamings and instantiations according to (Proposition 3.27) shows that the con-
clusion of (I ′,Γ′)∗R is not quite Γ′ ` r∗J , but is the same modulo a trivial renaming,
according to the following commutative square:
Γ′ inl◦r¯ //
r¯
%%
Θ
(I ′,Γ′)∗[ ] //
inl
OO
Γ = (I,Θ)∗[ ]
inl
OO
We can therefore conclude the derivation of r∗D by the rule (I ′,Γ′)∗R followed by a
trivial renaming.
It remains to derive the premises of (I ′,Γ′)∗R. Each such premise is linked to a
corresponding premise of (I,Θ)∗R by a renaming repecting types — specifically, a
context extension of r ◦ inl. But by induction, we have renameable derivations of the
premises of (I,Θ)∗R; so we are done.
It is worthwhile to record a special case of admissibility of renaming.
Corollary 5.19 (Admissibility of weakening). If a substitutive raw type theory derives
Γ ` J substitution-free, then it also derives ∆ ` w∗J substitution-free for any weak-
ening w : Γ→ ∆, i.e., an injective variable renaming such that ∆w(i) = w∗Γi for all
i ∈ |Γ|.
We can now give the action of substitution on derivations.
Lemma 5.20 (Admissibility of substitution). Let T be a substitutive raw type theory
over signature Σ. Let f : ∆ → Γ be a raw substitution over Σ, and K ⊆ |Γ| a
complemented subset such that:
1. f acts trivially at each i ∈ K in the sense of Definition 4.27, i.e., for some j ∈ ∆,
f(i) = varj and ∆j = f∗Γi
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2. for each i ∈ |Γ| \K, T derives ∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi without substitutions.
Given a substifution-free derivation D of Γ ` J over T , there is a substitution-free
derivation f∗D of ∆ ` f∗J .
Before proceeding with the proof, we take a moment to comment on the condition
the lemma assumes on f . It matches the condition used in the premises of the substi-
tution rule, skipping type-checking on a set of indices K on which f acts trivially, and
requiring derivability of ∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi only for i ∈ |Γ| \K. An alternative, maybe
more conventional condition would be to require ∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi for all i ∈ |Γ|.
There are a couple of reasons to weaken the condition as we do, thus strengthening
the statement of the lemma. The superficial one is its applicability to raw substitutions
that potentially contain ill-formed type expressions. The more essential one is that
strengthened formulation is needed to keep the proof structurally inductive, allowing
us to descend under a premise with a non-empty context, without needing to check
that in the process the domain of f∗ is extended with well-formed types. Even if they
are in fact well formed, we cannot show this by appealing to an induction hypothesis,
because the derivations involved are not structural subderivations of the one we are
recursing over. What happens instead is that verification of well-formedness of types
in contexts is deferred until their variables are accessed, at which point the variable
rule provides the desired structural subderivations. This phenomenon seems to be a
genuine consequence of spelling out the proof for a general class of type theories. For
any specific type theory, only certain concrete type-schemes will occur in contexts of
premises of rules; and these specific type-schemes are always designed by their authors
in such a way that they can be shown well-formed individually, so that the inductive
arguments do not break.
Proof of Lemma 5.20. Within this proof, all derivations are assumed substitution-free,
and a (substitution-free) derivation D of a judgement Γ ` J is called substitutable
when, for all ∆, f andK satisfying the condition of the lemma, we have a (substitution-
free) derivation of ∆ ` f∗J . We prove by induction that every derivation D is substi-
tutable. Much of the proof parallels that of Lemma 5.18.
Suppose D concludes with a variable rule showing Γ ` vari : Γi, and f : ∆ → Γ
is a suitable substitution, acting trivially on K ⊆ |Γ|. When i ∈ K, we work just
as in Lemma 5.18: given a suitable substitution into the conclusion, we inductively
substitute the premise derivation along the same substitution, and then conclude with
the variable rule. Otherwise, for i ∈ |Γ| \K, we use the derivation of ∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi
given by assumption.
Next, if D concludes with a trivial renaming inl−1 : Γ → Γ′, to conclude Γ ` J ,
then suppose f : ∆ → Γ is a substitution acting trivially on K and with derivations
of ∆ ` f(i) : f∗Γi for i ∈ |Γ| \ K. Then the substitution inl−1 ◦ f : ∆ → Γ′ acts
trivially on inl(K) ⊆ |Γ′|, and the same derivations witness that ∆ ` f(inl−1 i) : f∗Γ′i
for i ∈ |Γ′| \ inl (K). So by induction, we can substitute the derivation of the premise
along inl−1 ◦ f to derive ∆ ` f∗Jas required.
Otherwise, D must conclude with an instantiation (I,Θ)∗R, for some instantiation
I ∈ InstΣ,Θ(αR) and R a flat rule (structural or specific) with empty-context conclu-
sion ` J . So, suppose given a suitable substitution f : ∆→ (I,Θ)∗[ ], acting trivially
on K ⊆ |(I,Θ)∗[ ]| = Θ⊕ 0; we need to derive ∆ ` f∗I∗J .
Just as in Lemma 5.18, we substitute I along inl◦f : ∆→ Θ to get another instan-
tiation I ′ of αR over ∆, such that the conclusion of (I ′,∆)∗R is just a trivial renaming
away from ∆ ` f∗I∗J . So it remains just to derive the premises of (I ′,∆)∗R.
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Again as in Lemma 5.18, by induction we have substitutable derivations of all
premises of (I,Θ)∗R. So it suffices to give, for each premise (I ′,∆)∗Ψ ` I ′∗J ′ of
(I ′,∆)∗R, a substitution g : (I ′,∆)∗Ψ → (I,Θ)∗Ψ to the corresponding premise
of (I,Θ)∗R, with g∗I∗J ′ = I ′∗J
′, and with g satisfying the conditions of the lemma.
(Recall that (I,Θ)∗Ψ is the context extension of Θ by the instantiations of types from
Ψ, with positions |Θ| ⊕ |Ψ|, and (I ′,∆)∗ similarly.) We define:
g := (inl ◦ f)⊕ |Ψ| : (I ′,∆)∗ → (I,Θ)∗Ψ.
Now g∗I∗J ′ = I ′∗J
′ follows directly from Proposition 3.27 (which we will con-
tinue to use without further comment), the definitions of I ′ and g, and the following
commuting diagram.
(I ′,∆)∗Ψ
inl

g // (I,Θ)∗Ψ
inl

∆
inl◦f //
f
''
Θ
(I ′,∆)∗[ ] //
inl
OO
(I,Θ)∗[ ]
inl
OO
Next, g clearly acts trivially on inr∗ |Ψ| ⊆ |(I,Θ)∗Ψ|. It also acts trivially on the
subset of inl∗ |Θ| corresponding to the given K ⊆ |Θ| ⊕ 0 on which f acts trivially.
Taking the union of these as the trivial set for g, it remains to show that for i in
the subset of inl∗ |Θ| corresponding to |Θ| ⊕ 0 \ K, we have (I ′,∆)∗Ψ ` g(i) :
g∗((I,Θ)∗Ψ)i. But this judgement is just the renaming of ∆ ` f(j) : f∗((I,Θ)∗∅)i
along the evident map |∆| ⊕ 0 → |∆| ⊕ |Ψ|. So using Lemma 5.18 to rename the
derivation of ∆ ` f(j) : f∗((I,Θ)∗[ ])i supplied with f , we are done.
Next, we show that substitution respects judgemental equality of raw substitutions.
For this, we introduce a handy notation: for raw substitutions f, g : Γ′ → Γ and an
object judgement J , with head expression e and boundary B, we write (f ≡ g)∗J for
the equality judgement asserting that f∗e and g∗e are equal over the boundary f∗B.
Thus Γ′ ` (f ≡ g)∗(A type) stands for Γ′ ` f∗A ≡ g∗A and Γ′ ` (f ≡ g)∗(e : A)
stands for Γ′ ` f∗e ≡ g∗e : f∗A.
Lemma 5.21 (Admissibility of equality substitution). Let T be a substitutive and con-
gruous raw type theory over Σ. Let f, g : Γ′ → Γ be raw substitutions over Σ, and
K ⊆ |Γ| a complemented subset such that:
1. for each i ∈ K there exists some (necessarily unique) j ∈ |Γ′| such that f(i) =
g(i) = varj , and Γ′j = f
∗Γi or Γ′j = g
∗Γi,
2. for each i ∈ |Γ| \ K, T derives Γ′ ` f(i) : f∗Γi and Γ′ ` g(i) : g∗Γi and
Γ′ ` f(i) ≡ g(i) : f∗Γi without substitutions.
If T derives Γ ` J without substitutions, then T derives Γ′ ` f∗J , Γ′ ` g∗J , and (if J
is an object judgement) Γ′ ` (f ≡ g)∗J , still without substitutions.
The assumption on f and g is perhaps a little surprising, especially the last “or”
in case (1). Another peculiarity is the fact that we include Γ′ ` f∗J and Γ′ ` g∗J
in the conclusion rather than obtaining them by elimination of substitution. The point
is that the induction arguments need to work when we pass into extended contexts of
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premises, whereby types of the form f∗A or g∗A are introduced; so we cannot assume
either f or g satisfying the conditions of Theorem 5.22 individually, but need to give a
condition on them together that is preserved. And since this condition is too weak for
applying elimination of substitution to f or g, we carry the conclusion of that along as
well.
Proof of Lemma 5.21. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation D of Γ ` J .
The details are closely analogous to elimination of substitution, so we spell out fewer.
Consider the case when D ends with a variable rule
Γ ` Γi type
Γ ` vari : Γi
If case (2) applies for i, we are done immediately. If case (1) applies, we obtain
derivations of Γ′ ` f∗Γi type, Γ′ ` g∗Γi type, and Γ′ ` f∗Γi ≡ g∗Γi by induc-
tion hypothesis. If Γ′j = f∗Γi then Γ
′ ` varj : f∗Γi follows by the variable rule and
Γ′ ` varj : g∗Γi from it by conversion. And of course, Γ′ ` varj ≡ varj : Γ′j is
derivable by reflexivity. If Γ′j = g∗Γi, the situation is symmetric.
Otherwise, D concludes with an instantiation I∗R where I ∈ InstΣ,Γ(αR) and R
is either an equality rule, a conversion rule, or a specific rule of T . The conclusion of
I∗R has the form Γ ` I∗J ′. We need to derive Γ′ ` f∗(I∗J ′), Γ′ ` g∗(I∗J ′), and if R
is an object rule then also Γ′ ` (f ≡ g)∗(I∗J ′).
Let us first verify that the raw substitutions f ′ := f ⊕|∆| : Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆→ Γ . I∗∆
and g′ := g ⊕ |∆| : Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ → Γ . I∗∆ satisfy the conditions (1) and (2)
of the lemma for the complemented subset K ′ ⊆ |Γ . I∗∆| = |Γ| + |∆|, given by
K ′ = {ι0(i) | i ∈ K} ∪ {ι1(k) | k ∈ |∆|}:
1. For ι0(i) ∈ K ′, there is j ∈ Γ′ such that f(i) = g(i) = varj and either Γ′j =
f∗Γi or Γ′j = g
∗Γi. Now f ′ and g′ satisfy condition (1) because f ′(ι0(i)) =
varι0(j) = g
′(ι0(i)) and (Γ′ . (f∗I)∆∗)ι0(j) = ι0∗Γ
′
j , which is equal either to
ι0∗(f∗Γi) = f ′∗(Γ . I∗∆) or to ι0∗(g∗Γi) = g′∗(Γ . I∗∆), as the case may be.
2. For ι1(k) ∈ K ′, condition (1) is satisfied by f ′ and g′: it is clear that f ′(ι1(k)) =
varι1(k) = g
′(ι1(k)), while f ′∗(Γ . I∗∆)ι1(k) = f
′∗(I∗∆k) = (f∗I)∗∆k =
(Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆)ι1(k) holds, where we used Proposition 3.27 in the second step.
3. For ι0(j) ∈ (|Γ|+ |∆|)\K ′, f ′ and g′ satisfy (2) because the desired judgements
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` f ′(ι0(j)) : f ′∗(Γ . I∗∆)ι0(j)
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` g′(ι0(j)) : g′∗(Γ . I∗∆)ι0(j)
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` f ′(ι0(j)) ≡ g′(ι0(j)) : f ′∗(Γ . I∗∆)ι0(j)
are respectively equal to
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` ι0∗(f(j)) : ι0∗(f∗Γj)
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` ι0∗(g(j)) : ι0∗(g∗Γj)
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` ι0∗(f(j)) ≡ ι0∗(g(j)) : ι0∗(f∗Γj)
and these are derivable by Lemma 5.18 applied to the renaming ι0 and the as-
sumptions (2) for f and g.
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We similarly check that the raw substitutions f ′′ := f⊕|∆| : Γ′.(g∗I)∗∆→ Γ.I∗∆
and g′′ := g ⊕ |∆| : Γ′ . (g∗I)∗∆→ Γ . I∗∆ satisfy the conditions of the lemma with
the same set K ′, too. The verification is similar to the case of f ′ and g′ above, and at
this point the disjunction in (1) lets us exchange the role of g and f .
We may now derive Γ′ ` f∗(I∗J ′) by the closure rule (f∗I)∗R, as it has the correct
conclusion by Proposition 3.27. To see that its premises are derivable, we verify that
for any premise ∆ ` J ′′ of R, the instantiation by f∗I , namely
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` (f∗I)∗J ′′ (5.7)
is derivable. The corresponding premise of I∗R, which is
Γ . I∗∆ ` I∗J ′′, (5.8)
is derivable by assumption, and so we obtain (5.7) by the induction hypothesis for (5.8)
applied to f ′ and g′.
By a similar argument Γ′ ` g∗(I∗J ′) is derivable by the closure rule (g∗I)∗R, we
only need to use f ′′ and g′′ instead of f ′ and g′ to derive the premise
Γ′ . (g∗I)∗∆ ` (g∗I)∗J ′′. (5.9)
It remains to be checked that Γ′ ` (f ≡ g)∗(I∗J ′) is derivable when R is an object
rule. Because T is congruous, the congruence rule C associated with R is a specific
rule of T . Let `, r : Σ+αR → Σ+αC be the signature maps from Definition 4.34 and
I ′ := f∗I+g∗I ∈ InstΣ,Γ′(αR+αR). Note that I ′∗ ◦`∗ = f∗I and I ′∗ ◦r∗ = g∗I . The
instantiation I ′∗C is a closure rule whose conclusion is precisely Γ
′ ` (f ≡ g)∗(I∗J ′),
so we only have to establish that its premises are derivable, of which there are three
kinds:
1. For each premise ∆ ` J ′′ of R, there is a corresponding premise I ′∗(`∗(∆ `
J ′′)), which is equal to (5.7). We have already seen that it is derivable.
2. For each premise ∆ ` J ′′ of R, there is a corresponding premise I ′∗(r∗(∆ `
J ′′)), which is equal to (5.9). Its derivability has been established, too.
3. For each object premise ∆ ` J ′′ of R, there is a corresponding premise, namely
the associated equality judgement (Definition 4.33) instantiated by I ′. A short
calculation relying on Proposition 3.27 shows that the judgement is
Γ′ . (f∗I)∗∆ ` (f ′ ≡ g′)∗J ′′,
which is one of the consequences of the induction hypothesis for (5.8) applied to
f ′ and g′.
We can now put these together into the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.22 (Elimination of substitution). Let T be a substitutive and congruous
raw type theory; then every derivable judgement over T has a substitution-free deriva-
tion.
Proof. Work by induction over the original derivation. At substitution rules, apply
Lemma 5.20; and at equality substitution rules, Lemma 5.21.
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5.5 Uniqueness of typing
Whether it is desirable for a term to have many types depends on one’s motivations, but
certainly in our setting, where the terms record detailed information about premises, we
should expect a term to have at most one type, which we prove here.
Theorem 5.23. If a tight, substitutive raw type theory T derives Γ ` A type, Γ `
B type, Γ ` t : A and Γ ` t : B then it also derives Γ ` A ≡ B.
Proof. By Theorem 5.22 it suffices to prove the claim for substitution-free derivations.
Suppose we have derivations DA, DB , D1 and D2:
DA
Γ ` A type
DB
Γ ` B type
D1
Γ ` t : A
D2
Γ ` t : B
The proof proceeds by a double induction on the derivations D1 and D2.
Consider the case where D1 ends with a conversion:
D1,A′
Γ ` A′ type
D1,A
Γ ` A type
D1,t
Γ ` t : A′
D1,eq
Γ ` A′ ≡ A
Γ ` t : A
We apply the induction hypothesis to D1,t and D2 to derive Γ ` A′ ≡ B. The desired
Γ ` A ≡ B now follows from D1,eq by symmetry and transitivity of equality. The
case where D2 ends with a conversion is symmetric, except that it does not require the
use of symmetry.
Consider the case where D1 ends with a variable rule:
D′1
Γ ` Γj type
Γ ` varj : Γj
Because T is tight D2 must end with a variable or a conversion rule. We have already
dealt with the latter one. If D2 ends with a variable rule, then A = Γj = B, and we
may conclude Γ ` A ≡ B by reflexivity.
In the remaining case D1 and D2 both end with instantiations of specific rules
of T . Let β be the map which takes each symbol S ∈ Σ to the corresponding symbol
rule in T . There is a unique symbol S ∈ Σ, such that D1 and D2 both end with
instantiations of β(S):
D1
Γ ` I∗S(〈metai〉i∈arg S) : I∗C
D2
Γ ` J∗S(〈metaj〉j∈arg S) : J∗C
Of course, I∗C is just A and J∗C is B, and both heads are equal to t, from which it
follows that
S(〈I∗metai〉i∈arg S) = S(〈J∗metai〉i∈arg S),
and so I and J are equal because they match on every i ∈ argS. Thus A = I∗C =
J∗C = B, and we may derive Γ ` A ≡ B by reflexivity.
We record a more economical version of uniqueness of typing, which one can afford
in reasonable situations.
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Corollary 5.24. If an acceptable type theory derives Γ ` e : A and Γ ` e : B then it
also derives Γ ` A ≡ B.
Proof. Apply Theorem 5.15 to Γ ` e : A and Γ ` e : B to obtain Γ ` A type and
Γ ` B type, and conclude by Theorem 5.23.
Acceptability also easily gives us uniqueness of typing for term equalities.
Corollary 5.25. If an acceptable type theory derives Γ ` s ≡ t : A and Γ ` s ≡ t : B
then it also derives Γ ` A ≡ B.
Proof. Again, apply Theorem 5.15 to get Γ ` A type and Γ ` B type, and conclude
by Theorem 5.23.
5.6 An inversion principle
Given the fact that a judgement Γ ` J is derivable, to what extent can a derivation of
it be constructed just from the information given in the judgement? We show in this
section that, for sufficiently well-behaved type theories, one can read off the proof-
relevant part of a derivation from the head of J . The proof-irrelevant parts are the
applications of conversion rules, and subderivations of equalities. The former may be
arranged to always appear just once after variable and symbol rules, while the latter
must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as a particular type theory may or may not
possess an algorithm that checks derivability of equalities.
When we attempt to reconstruct a derivation from a judgement, the first obstacle
we face is what types should be given to the subterms appearing in a judgement. For
the variables the answer is clear, while for symbol expressions it is natural to use the
types dictated by the corresponding rules, as follows.
Definition 5.26. Let T be a tight raw type theory over Σ and β the assignment of
rules to the symbols of Σ. Thus for each term symbol S ∈ Σ, the conclusion of β(S)
takes the form ` Ŝ : AS for some AS ∈ ExprtyΣ+αR(0). Given a term expression
t ∈ ExprtmΣ (Γ), its natural type τΓ(t) ∈ ExprtyΣ(Γ) is defined by
τΓ(vari) := Γi and τΓ(S(e)) := e∗AS ,
where we used e ∈ ∏i∈arg S ExprclS iΣ (γ ⊕ bindS i) as an instantiation, so that e∗AS
is the expression in which each metai(e′) is replaced by (e′)∗ei.
To put it more simply, the natural type of S(e) is the type one obtains by applying
the symbol rule for S to the premises determined by e.
Theorem 5.27 (Inversion principle). Let T be an acceptable type theory over Σ.
1. If T derives Γ ` vari : A then it does so by an application of a variable rule,
followed by a conversion:
D′
Γ ` vari : Γi
D′′
Γ ` Γi ≡ A
Γ ` vari : A
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2. If T derives Γ ` S(e) : A then it does so by an application of the symbol rule
for S, followed by a conversion:
D′
Γ ` S(e) : τΓ(S(e))
D′′
Γ ` τΓ(S(e)) ≡ A
Γ ` S(e) : A
3. If T derives Γ ` S(e) type then it does so by an application of the symbol rule
for S.
Proof. Let T be an acceptable type theory over Σ, and β the assignment of symbol
rules to the symbols of Σ. To establish the first two claims, we proceed by induction
on a substitution-free derivation D, which exists by Theorem 5.22.
If D ends with a variable rule,
D
Γ ` Γi type
Γ ` vari : Γi
then we obtain the desired derivation by attaching a dummy conversion rule:
D
Γ ` Γi type
Γ ` vari : Γi
D
Γ ` Γi type
Γ ` Γi ≡ Γi
Γ ` vari : Γi
Otherwise, D ends with an application of the conversion rule
D′
Γ ` vari : B
D′′
Γ ` B ≡ A
Γ ` vari : A
We apply the induction hypothesis to D′ to obtain a derivation of the form
D∗
Γ ` vari : Γi
D∗∗
Γ ` Γi ≡ B
Γ ` vari : B
Using the transitivity rule, we combine D∗∗ and D′′ into a derivation of Γ ` Γi ≡ A,
which can then be used together with D∗ to get the desired form of derivation.
If D ends with an application of the symbol rule β(S),
D′
Γ ` S(e) : τΓ(S(e))
,
then by Theorem 5.15 there is a derivationD′′ of the presupposition Γ ` τΓ(S(e)) type.
We apply reflexivity toD′′ to obtain Γ ` τΓ(S(e)) ≡ τΓ(S(e)), and then conversion to
get the desired derivation. Otherwise, D ends with an application of a conversion rule,
in which case we proceed as in the variable case.
The third claim is trivial, because β(S) is the only rule which can be instantiated
to have the conclusion Γ ` S(e) type, apart from substitution rules, which we have
dispensed with.
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The above theorem may be applied repeatedly to obtain a canonical form of the
proof-relevant part of a derivation. The missing subderivations of equalities must be
provided by other means. Also notice that it is easy enough to avoid insertion of un-
necessary appeals to conversion rules along reflexivity.
A useful consequence of Theorem 5.27 is the fact that a type of a term may be
calculated directly from the term (and the symbol rules), as long as it has one.
Corollary 5.28. In an acceptable type theory, a typeable term has its natural type.
Proof. Whenever Γ ` e : A is derivable, then so is Γ ` e : τΓ(e) because its derivation
appears as a subderivation in the statement of Theorem 5.27.
6 Well-founded presentations
So far, our type theories have omitted one typical characteristic occurring in practice:
the ordering of the presentation of the theory. This ordering appears, implicitly or
explicitly, at three levels:
1. The positions of a context usually form a finite sequence, and each type depends
only on the preceding part of the context.
2. The premises of each rule typically follow some well-founded order, usually
simply a finite sequence, and the boundary of each premise depends only on the
earlier ones.
3. The rules of the theory are themselves well-founded, and each rule depends only
on the earlier rules. This order is quite often infinite, in for instance theories with
hierarchies of universes, and need not be total, as seen in the example below.
At each of these three levels, the “depends only on” holds in two senses:
1. Raw expressions: each type expression of a context uses only the preceding vari-
ables; in a rule, the expressions of each premise boundary only use previously-
introduced metavariables; and in a theory, the raw premises and boundary of a
rule only use previously-introduced symbols of the theory.
2. Derivations for presuppositivity: each type expression in a context is a derivable
type over just the preceding part of the context; each premise of a rule can be
checked well-formed using just the preceding premises; and so can each rule
using just the earlier rules.
Example 6.1. The Π-formation rule uses no symbols of the signature in its premises
or boundary, and relies only on structural rules for its well-formedness. The rules for
λ-abstraction and function application both use Π in their raw expressions, and depend
on the Π-formation rule for their reasonability, but not on any other earlier symbols or
rules. And the β-reduction rule in turn depends on all three of these.
Similarly, there is a natural order within the rules for Σ-types. On the other hand,
neither of the Σ- or Π-type groups naturally precedes the other, and it would be unnat-
ural to force them into a total order.
Traditionally, well-foundedness is treated in two different ways, depending on the
levels. Since the class of all contexts of a theory is formally defined — contexts are
“user-definable” — their well-foundedness must be explicitly mandated somehow; and
so it is, usually by the context judgement ` Γ cxt.
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Rules and theories by contrast are not “user-definable”: each development usually
presents a single theory, or a few, with a specific collection of rules. The ordering on
these can therefore be left entirely unstated, but it is almost always clearly present. The
writer ensures it when setting up the theory; the reader follows it when understanding
the theory, and convincing themself of its reasonableness; and it is respected in later
proofs and constructions.
It would be jarring, for instance, and often logically impossible, to give the se-
mantics of β-reduction before that of λ-abstraction. On the other hand, it would be
unsurprising if a writer introduced the rules for Π-types before those for Σ-types, but
then gave semantics with Σ-types first. Overall, the implicit partial order on rules is
always respected, but no particular total extension of it is.
Defining what it means for a presentation to be ordered is a little subtler than one
might expect; we work up to it gradually, considering contexts first, then rules, and
finally theories.
6.1 Sequential contexts
In our setting, with scoped syntax, and with contexts as maps from positions to types
(we henceforth refer to these as flat contexts), traditional sequential contexts may be
recovered in various ways. They are all straightforwardly equivalent — indeed, a suffi-
ciently informal statement of the traditional definition could be read as any of them —
but explicitly comparing them provides a useful warmup for the less straightforward
cases with rules and type theories later.
Recall that [n] denotes the sum of n ∈ N copies of [1]. When working with sequen-
tial contexts, we will identify the positions of [n] with {0, . . . , n − 1}, and denote the
evident “subscope inclusion” maps by wi,j : [i]→ [j].
Definition 6.2 (Sequential context I). A raw sequential context over a signature Σ is
a list Γ = [Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1], where Γi ∈ ExprtyΣ([i]), for each i ∈ [n]. We write Γ<i
for the initial segment [Γ0, . . . ,Γi−1]. The flattening of a raw sequential context is the
raw flat context of scope [n] whose i-th type is the weakening wi,n∗(Γi). We typically
leave flattening implicit, writing Γ both for a sequential context and its flattening.
Given a signature Σ and a raw type theory T over it, a raw sequential context Γ over
Σ is well-formed over T if for each i ∈ Γ, the judgement Γ<i ` Γi type is derivable.
Alternately, we can define sequentiality as a property of flat contexts:
Definition 6.3 (Sequential context II). A raw flat context Γ of scope [n] is sequential if
for each i ∈ [n], all variables varj occurring in Γi have j < i. Thus each Γi is uniquely
of the form wi,n∗(Γi), from which we define the initial segments Γ<i as sequential raw
contexts of scope [i].
A sequential context Γ over Σ is well-formed over T if for each i ∈ Γ, the judge-
ment Γ<i ` Γi type is derivable.
Finally, we can define well-formed flat contexts via the traditional derivation rules,
without reference to raw sequential contexts.
Definition 6.4 (Sequential context III). The property ` Γ cxt, read as “Γ is sequen-
tially well-formed” over a given theory, is the inductive predicate on flat contexts de-
44
fined by the following closure conditions, the latter for all suitable Γ, A:
` [ ] cxt
` Γ cxt Γ ` A type
` Γ . A cxt
Each of the above definitions moreover has two possible readings: proof-relevant,
where by derivability of a judgement Γ ` A type we mean that a specific derivation
is given, and proof-irrelevant, where we merely mean that some derivation exists. We
take the proof-relevant reading in all cases.
Proposition 6.5. Definitions 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are all equivalent, as predicates on flat
contexts, in both their proof-relevant and -irrelevant forms.
Proof. Essentially straightforward, given the fact, already mentioned in Definition 6.3,
that the variable-occurrence constraint there precisely characterises the images of the
weakenings wi,n∗ : Expr
ty
Σ([i]) ↪→ ExprtyΣ([n]).
Of these definitions, Definition 6.3 is the simplest to state, especially if one sweeps
under the rug the inverse-weakening required for defining initial segments. However,
when spelling out details carefully, this inverse-weakening is tedious to keep track of.
When we bump these definitions up to sequential rules or type theories, therefore, we
will focus on approaches based on Definitions 6.2 and 6.4.
6.2 Sequential rules
Next, we wish to define sequential rules, in which premises form a finite sequence, and
each refers only to the previous ones. Analogously to Definition 6.3, the easiest version
to state is to start from an ordinary raw rule, and add desirable properties, together with
restrictions on how earlier parts can be used in later parts:
Definition 6.6 (Sequential rule, provisional). Let R be a tight raw rule over a signa-
ture Σ, with premises indexed by [n], and β the bijection witnessing its tightness. We
say that R is sequential if for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ αR, if metaj appears in the i-th
premise, then β(j) < i.
Moreover, say that R is (sequentially) well-formed over a raw type theory T , also
over Σ, when for all i ∈ [n], the presuppositions of the i-th premise ofR can be derived
from the premises indexed by [i].
This definition is adequate, but is in several regards somewhat unsatisfying:
1. We have said here, as in Definition 6.3, that the premises are formed over the
extension by all the metavariables, and their presuppositions derived from all the
premises, but use only the preceding ones. When applying this condition, one
typically wants to consider them as formed, or derived, over the extension by
just the preceding initial segment. So rather than restricting them back there, and
having to keep track of such restriction, it is simpler to say from the start, as in
Definition 6.2, that they are formed, or derived, over those initial segments.
2. “Tightness” gives a redundancy of data in two ways. Firstly, the heads of all
object-judgement premises are redundant: each head must be the corresponding
metavariable, applied to all variables of its scope. Besides this, the arity itself is
determined by the indexing family of the rule together with the scopes and forms
of the premises.
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These issues can be remedied by defining sequential presentations inductively, anal-
ogously to Definition 6.4, and adding each premise not as a full judgement but just its
boundary, whose head, if any, will be filled in automatically to ensure tightness by
construction.
Definition 6.7. Given a signature Σ and a raw type theory T over it, we define in-
ductively the sequential premise-families P with arities αP , and simultaneously their
flattenings as families of judgements over Σ + αP , as follows.
1. The empty sequential premise-family 〈 〉 has empty arity α〈 〉, and its flattening
is the empty family.
2. Let P be a sequential premise-family, with arity αP and flattening F . Let ∆ ` B
be a boundary over Σ+αP , such that all presuppositions of ∆ ` B are derivable
over (T + F ) + αP (i.e. the translation of T + F from Σ to Σ + αP ), and ∆ is
a well-formed sequential context over the same theory.
Then there is an extension sequential premise-family P ; (∆ ` B).
If ∆ ` B is an object boundary of class c, then the associated arity αP ;(∆`B) is
αP + 〈(c, |∆|)〉; or if ∆ ` B is an equality boundary, αP ;(∆`B) is just αP .
The flattening of P ; (∆ ` B) is 〈ι∗(Γi ` Ji) | i ∈ I〉+ 〈(ι∗∆) ` J〉, where ι is
the inclusion αP → αP ;(∆`B), and J is ι∗B with the head, if any, filled by the
expression meta?(〈vari〉i∈δ), where ? is the new argument adjoined to the arity.
Notationally, we will not distinguish the flattening from the sequential premise-family
itself.
Definition 6.8. A sequential rule P =⇒ J over Σ and T is a sequential premise-
family P , together with a judgement Γ ` J over Σ + αP , the conclusion, whose
presuppositions are derivable over T +P (with T translated to the metavariable exten-
sion). A sequential rule has an evident flattening as a raw rule.
Again, we do not notate the flattening explicitly. Note that as in the definition of raw
rules the conclusion J has an empty context.
The addition of a boundary in the extension step of Definition 6.7 is precisely analo-
gous to the traditional context extension rule, as in Definition 6.4. There, the extension
is specified just by a type A, but its effect is to add a term-of-type judgement vari :A,
where the term is automatically determined to be a (fresh) variable, rather than speci-
fied as input to the extension.
Reading Definition 6.7 with an eye towards computer-formalisation, one may note
it can be formalized in several ways: as an inductive-recursive definition of a set with
functions to arities and families of judgements; as an inductive family of sets indexed
over pairs of an arity and a family of judgements; or an N-indexed sequence of sets
together with functions to arities and families, by induction on n ∈ N, the length of the
family. These are all equivalent, by standard generalities about inductive definitions.
Proposition 6.9. The flattening of a sequential rule with empty conclusion context is
acceptable.
Proof. Tightness is immediate, by construction of the arity of the premise-family and
the heads of its object-judgement premises. Presuppositivity is similarly by construc-
tion, from the well-formedness conditions in the definitions of sequential rules and
premise-families, with the latter inductively translated along metavariable extensions
as the premise-family is built up.
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As we defined premise-families using just boundaries rather than complete judge-
ments, similarly when we define well-founded type theories we will specify them using
sequential rules whose conclusions have no heads. We will also (for substitutivity) re-
strict attention to empty conclusion contexts.
Definition 6.10. A sequential rule-boundary P =⇒ B over Σ and T is a sequential
premise-family P , together with a boundary Γ ` B over Σ + αP with empty context,
whose presuppositions are derivable over T + P .
Rule-boundaries can of course be completed to rules, by filling in a head if required.
Definition 6.11. The realisation of a sequential rule-boundary R = (P =⇒ B) as a
sequential rule (or, via flattening, a raw rule) is defined according to the form of B:
1. If B is an object boundary of class c, then given a symbol S ∈ Σ with arity αP
and class c, the realisation R[S] of R with S is the sequential rule
P =⇒ B[Ŝ]
given by completing B with the generic application of S.
2. If B is an equality, no further input is required: the realisation of R is just
P =⇒ B with B viewed as a judgement.
This gives, by construction:
Proposition 6.12. The realisation of an object rule-boundary for S yields a symbol
rule for S.
Example 6.13. The sequential rule-boundary
(` A type); (x:A ` B(x) type) =⇒ (`  type)
realised with the symbol Π gives the sequential rule
(` A type); (x:A ` B(x) type) =⇒ (` Π(A,B(x)) type)
whose flattening is the usual formation rule for dependent products, as in Example 4.35.
With Σ instead of Π, it gives the formation rule for dependent sums.
6.3 Well-presented rules
Sequential rules and rule-boundaries give a satisfactory treatment covering most ex-
ample theories, and sufficing for many purposes, including implementation in proof
assistants. For instance, the Andromeda proof assistant (Andromedans, 2020; Bauer
et al., 2019) implements a variant of sequential rules and rule boundaries in the trusted
nucleus.
Here we consider the generalisation from finite sequences to arbitrary well-founded
orders, partly to encompass infinitary rules, but mainly as a warm-up for well-founded
theories.
Definitions 6.14, 6.15 and 6.18 given below are rather long and pedantic, so we
give first a guiding overview. We follow the pattern first seen in Definition 6.2, where
the components of the definitions must be stratified into several stages, with each stage
making use of functions defined on earlier stages.
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1. At the first stage, we can specify just the shape of the family of premises. This
consists of a well-ordered set (P,<), to index the premises, along with for each
i ∈ P , the judgement form ϕi and scope γi for the i-th premise.
Form this data we can compute the arity of the rule, αP , and more generally the
arity αP<i , specifying what metavariables may occur in the i-th premise.
2. At the second stage, with the arities αP<i available, we can specify the raw
syntax of the premises. The i-th premise Pi is given by a boundary Γi ` Bi of
form ϕi, scope γi, and written over Σ + αP<i .
From these, filling in heads of object premises as required for tightness, we can
construct the flattening of P as family of judgements over Σ + αP , and more
generally the flattening of P<i over Σ + αP<i .
3. At the third stage, with the flattenings available, we can now specify the well-
formedness conditions. Derivations of presuppositions of Pi should be given
over the ambient theory T , translated up to Σ + αP<i , and with (the flattenings
of) preceding premises P<i available as hypotheses.
4. We are now done with the hard part. Having specified the premises, the conclu-
sion is given as in the sequential case, as a well-formed boundaryB over Σ+αP ,
whose head (if B is of object form) will later be filled in to yield a symbol rule.
While the above explanation sounds plausible, it sweeps several technical subtleties
under the rug. Most importantly, since each premise is specified over its own signature
Σ + αP<i , we need to handle the translations between these extensions, and up to
the overall extension Σ + αP . Spelling out all details in full, we have the following
definitions.
Definition 6.14. A well-founded premises-shape (I, S) is given by a well-founded set
(I,<), and a family S = 〈(ϕi, γi)〉i∈I , where ϕi is a judgement form and γi a scope.
Given these, we define:
1. The arity αS of S is the subfamily 〈(ϕi, γi)〉{i∈I|ϕi∈{ty,tm}} of the object forms
of S.
2. For each i ∈ I , the initial segment S<i := 〈(ϕj , γj)〉j<i is itself a well-founded
premises-shape indexed by the initial segment ↓i ⊆ I , and hence it also has an
associated arity αS<i .
3. For each i < j ∈ I , there are evident family maps αS<i → αS<j and hence
S<i → S<j , satisfying evident composition conditions with each other and with
the subfamily inclusions S<j → S.
Definition 6.15. Given a signature Σ and a well-founded premises-shape (I, S) as in
Definition 6.14, a well-founded premise-family P is given by a family B = 〈Bi〉i∈I
where Bi is a boundary of form ϕi in scope γi, and over Σ + αS<i . Given these, we
define:
1. The flattening P [ is the family of judgements 〈Pi〉i∈I over Σ +αS , where Pi is
the boundary Bi translated along the inclusion Σ + αS<i → Σ + αS , and when
ϕi ∈ {ty, tm} completed with the head expression metai(〈varj〉j∈γi).
2. For each i ∈ I , the initial segment B<i yields a well-founded premise family
P<i with respect to the well-founded premises-shape S<i indexed by the initial
segment ↓i. Thus it has its own flattening P [<i.
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3. For each j < i, the judgement Pj as a member of the flattening P [<i translated
along the signature inclusion Σ +αS<i → Σ +αS yields the same flattening Pj ,
but as a member of P [.
This exhibits the translation of P [<i along the inclusion Σ + αS<i → Σ + αS as
a subfamily of P [.
4. Similarly, for all k < j < i, the judgement Pk as a member of the flattening P [<j
translated along the signature inclusion Σ + αS<j → Σ + αS<i yields the same
flattening Pk, but as a member of P [<i.
This exhibits the translation of P [<j along the inclusion Σ + αS<j → Σ + αS<i
as a subfamily of P [<i.
Definition 6.16. A well-founded premise-family P as in Definition 6.15 is well-formed
over T if for each i ∈ I , there are derivations of all presuppositions of Bi from hy-
potheses P [<i, in the translation of T to Σ + αS<i .
A well-presented premise-family is a well-formed well-founded premise-family P .
Its arity αP is the associated arity αS of the underlying premises-shape S.
When no confusion can occur, we will write the flattening of a well-founded premise-
family P just as P , rather than P [.
Definition 6.17. A well-presented rule-boundary P =⇒ B over Σ, T consists of a
well-presented premise-family P together with a boundary with empty context ` B
over Σ + αP , the conclusion boundary, such that all presuppositions of B derivable
from P in the translation of T to Σ + αP . The arity of such a rule-boundary is the
arity αP of its premise-family.
Definition 6.18. The realisation of a well-presented rule-boundary R = (P =⇒ B)
as a raw rule is defined according to the form of B.
1. If B is an object boundary of class c, then given a symbol S ∈ Σ of arity αP and
class c, the realisation R[S] of R with S has premises the flattening of P , and
conclusion B[Ŝ].
2. If B is an equality boundary, no extra input is required: the realisation of R
has premises the flattening of P , and conclusion just B viewed as an equality
judgement.
6.4 Well-presented type theories
Finally, we reach well-foundedness for type theories. Once again, a by now familiar
pattern emerges. It is fairly straightforward to define well-foundedness as an after-
market property of acceptable type theories, but a better definition is obtained by
putting in a little more work.
We start with the simpler version.
Definition 6.19. Let T = 〈Ri〉i∈I be an acceptable type theory over a signature Σ,
and let β : |Σ| → I the bijection from symbols to their rules. Then T is well-founded
when all its rules are well-founded, and the index set I has a well-founded order <,
such that:
1. If S ∈ Σ appears in Ri then β(S) < i.
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2. Each Rj has derivations of presuppositions that only refer to symbols S with
β(S) < j and rules Ri with i < j.
For the more refined version, we follow a similar pattern to what we saw for well-
presented rules in Section 6.3, with the definition stratified into three stages:
1. First, the shape: a well-founded order (to index the rules), and the premises-
shapes and judgement forms of all rules. This suffices to compute the signature
of the theory, and of its initial segments.
2. Next, the raw part: for each rule of the theory, a well-founded premise-family,
and (raw) conclusion boundaries, of the shapes and forms specified in the first
stage, and over the signature of the appropriate initial segment. These suffice
to compute the flattening of the theory as a raw type theory, and of its initial
segments.
3. Finally, the derivations showing well-formedness of each rule over the preceding
initial segment.
Having previously given Definitions 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 in rather excruciating de-
tail, we proceed here slightly more concisely, trusting the reader to be able to fill in the
elided details along the lines spelled out in those definitions.
Definition 6.20.
1. A well-founded type theory shape T consists of a well-founded order (I,<),
together with for each i ∈ I , a well-founded premises-shape Si and judgement
form ϕi (seen as the premises shape and conclusion form of the ith rule).
From these, we can define the total signature ΣT of T : its symbols are just
{Si ∈ I | ϕi ∈ {ty, tm}}, with Si having arity αSi and class ϕi. Similarly, we
get signatures for initial segments ΣT<i , and signature maps between these, and
from these to ΣT .
2. A well-founded raw type theory T consists of a well-founded type theory shape
as above (which we also call T ), together with for each i ∈ I , a well-founded
premise-family Pi of shape Si and a boundary Bi of form ϕi over the signa-
ture ΣT<i .
From these, we can define the flattening T [ of T as a raw type theory over ΣT .
Its rules consist of the realisations of all rule-boundaries Pi =⇒ Bi, using (when
i is of object form) the symbol Si, together with the associated congruence rules
of the object rules thus added. Similarly, we obtain the flattening T [<i of each
initial segments of T , as a raw type theory over ΣT<i .
3. A well-presented type theory T consists of a well-founded raw type theory T
as above that is additionally well-formed, in that it is equipped with, for each i,
derivations exhibiting Pi =⇒ Bi as a well-formed rule-boundary over T [<i.
As with well-presented rules, we will not notate flattening, when there is no ambiguity.
Proposition 6.21. The flattening of a well-presented type theory T is acceptable and
well-founded.
Proof. Well-foundedness, tightness, substitutivity, and congruousness are immediate
by construction. Presuppositivity is almost as direct, requiring just translation of well-
formedness of rules from the signatures ΣT<i and theories T<i up to the full signature
Σ and theory T .
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6.5 The well-founded replacement
Definition 5.12 of acceptable type theories allows cyclic references of three kinds: be-
tween types of a context, premises of a rule, or rules of a type theory. We shall not
concern ourselves with the former two, since type theories occurring in practice all
avoid them by using sequential contexts and sequential rules from Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
We address the latter one, to vindicate our design choices from earlier sections, to
demonstrate that our setup supports non-trivial meta-theoretic methods, and to give an
interesting new construction that likely has further applications.
For the remainder of this section, all contexts, raw rules, and rule-boundaries are
presumed to be sequential. Also, it will be convenient to speak of a raw theory T
without explicitly displaying its underlying signature. When we need to refer to the
signature, we do so by writing ΣT .
In Example 5.14 an acceptable type theory was rectified to a well-founded one by
the introduction of a new symbol and an equation. When one looks at other specific ex-
amples the same strategy works, possibly with the introduction of several symbols and
equations. In order to present a general method we first lay some category-theoretic
groundwork. We save the adventure of spiralling into the depths of category theory for
another day, and instead establish just enough structure to keep the syntactic construc-
tions organized.
Definition 6.22. A raw syntax map f : Σ → Σ′ is given by a family of expressions
fS ∈ ExprcSΣ′+arg S(0), one for each S ∈ Σ. Such a map acts on e ∈ ExprcΣ(γ) to give
f∗e ∈ ExprcΣ′(γ) by
f∗(vari) := vari and f∗(S(e)) := (f∗ ◦ e)∗fS . (6.1)
The metavariable extension f +α : Σ +α→ Σ′+α by arity α is the raw syntax map
defined by
(f + α)S := fS and (f + α)metai := metai(〈varj〉j∈bindα i)
In words, a raw syntax map Σ→ Σ′ interprets each symbol in Σ as a suitable com-
pound expression over Σ′, the interpretation extends compositionally to all expressions
over Σ, and metavariable extensions act on such a map by extending it trivially.
Let us unravel the second clause in (6.1), as it is a bit terse. Given a symbol S ∈ Σ
and its arguments e ∈ ∏i∈arg S ExprclS iΣ (γ ⊕ bindS i), the composition f∗ ◦ e takes
each i ∈ argS to f∗ei ∈ ExprclS iΣ′ (γ ⊕ bindS i) – it is an instantiation of arity argS,
which thus acts on fS to yield an expression (f∗ ◦ e)∗fS ∈ ExprcSΣ′ (γ), where we took
into account that γ ⊕ 0 = γ.
The action of a raw syntax map evidently extends from expressions to context,
judgements, and boundaries, and thanks to the metavariable extensions also to raw
rules and rule-boundaries.
Proposition 6.23. Signatures and raw syntax maps form a category:
• The identity morphism idΣ : Σ→ Σ takes S ∈ Σ to the generic application Ŝ.
• The composition of f : Σ → Σ′ and g : Σ′ → Σ′′ is the map g ◦ f : Σ → Σ′′
that interprets each S ∈ Σ as (g ◦ f)S := g∗fS .
Raw syntax map actions are functorial.
Proof. A straightforward application of the basic properties of instantiations.
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Given raw theories T and T ′, a raw syntax map f : ΣT → Σ′T between the under-
lying signatures may be entirely unrelated to T and T ′. Requiring it to map derivable
judgements in T to derivable judgements in T ′ helps, but ignores the fact that raw
theories are families of raw rules, not derivable judgements. Here is a better definition.
Definition 6.24. A raw theory map f : T → T ′ is a raw syntax map f : ΣT → Σ′T on
the underlying signatures which maps each specific rule R of T to a derivation of f∗R
in T ′.
Proposition 6.25. Raw theories and raw theory maps form a category RawTh. A raw
theory map f : T → T ′ acts functorially on a derivation D of Γ ` J in T to give a
derivation f∗D of f∗Γ ` f∗J in T ′.
Proof. Let us first describe the action of f on a derivation D of Γ ` J . We proceed by
recursion on the structure of D.
Structural rules are mapped to the corresponding structural rules, e.g., if D con-
cludes with a variable rule Γ ` vari : Γi then f∗D concludes with the variable rule
f∗Γ ` vari : f∗Γi, and similarly for other structural rules.
Consider the case whereD ends with an instantiation I∗R of a specific ruleR of T ,
whose premises are 〈Γk ` Jk〉k∈K . Suppose f takes R to the derivation DR of f∗R
in T ′. First we recursively map each derivation Dk of the k-th premise I∗Γk ` I∗Jk
to a derivation f∗Dk of f∗(I∗Γk ` I∗Jk) in T ′, which is the same as (f∗I)∗Γk `
(f∗I)∗Jk, because acting by I and then by f is the same as acting by the instantiation
f∗I . We then take f∗D to be the derivation (f∗I)∗RD with the derivations f∗Dk of its
hypotheses grafted onto it, as in Definition 2.10.
It is straightforward to verify that the action on derivations so constructed satisfies
functoriality, (g ◦ f)∗D = g∗(f∗D).
The categorical structure of RawTh is inherited from the structure of raw syntax
maps. Additionally, given composable raw theory maps f and g, we let their composi-
tion g ◦ f take a specific rule R to the derivation g∗DR, where DR is the derivation of
f∗R provided by f .
It may happen that a raw theory map f : T → T ′ maps an uninhabited type to an
inhabited one, or an underivable equality to a derivable one. Let us make precise the
sense in which such a map fails to be conservative, and at the same time generalise
inhabitation of types to general completion of boundaries in the presence of premises.
Definition 6.26. Given a raw theory T , and an object rule-boundary P =⇒ B over ΣT
whose syntactic class is cB , say that e ∈ ExprcBΣT+αP (0) realises the rule-boundary
when P =⇒ B[e] is derivable in T .
Example 6.27. Inhabitation of a closed type A corresponds to realisation of the rule-
boundary 〈 〉 =⇒  : A. We can also express more general inhabitation tasks, for
instance (` A type) =⇒  type asks for a construction of a type from a type parame-
ter A, and (` A type); ([var0 :A] ` B(var0) type) =⇒  type for a Π-like higher type
constructor.
Definition 6.28. A raw theory map f : T → T ′ is conservative when:
1. f reflects equations: if T ′ derives the equational rule f∗R then T derives the
equational rule R, and
2. f reflects realisers: there is a map r such that if e realises the object rule-
boundary f∗(P =⇒ B) in T ′ then r(R, e) realises P =⇒ B in T .
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In the definition, we asked for a map r to witness reflection of realisers in order to
avoid spurious applications of the axiom of choice.
Lemma 6.29. Every raw theory map f : T → U factors through a conservative map
f† : T † → U
T
f //
  
U
T †
f†
>>
in a weakly universal fashion.
In the lemma, by weak universality we mean that whenever f factors through a
conservative map g : V → U , there is a map h : T † → V , not necessarily unique, such
that the following diagram commutes:
T
f //
  
j
''
U
T †
f†
>>
h

V
g
RR (6.2)
Proof of Lemma 6.29. We shall construct T † by adjoining new symbols to T , so that
whenever e realises f∗R inU , the corresponding new symbol realisesR in T . However,
the new symbols generate new rule-boundaries, so the process needs to be iterated, and
we have to adjoin equations as well. The construction of f† : T † → U thus proceeds
in an inductive fashion, as follows.
Initially the signature ΣT † is just ΣT , the specific rules of T † are those of T , and f†
acts like f . We inductively extend ΣT † with new symbols, T † with new specific rules,
and f† with new values, as follows:
1. If P =⇒ B is an object rule-boundary in T † of arity α and e realises f†∗P =⇒
f†∗B in U , then we extend ΣT † with a new symbol c(P=⇒B,e) of arity α, and T †
with the associated symbol rule P =⇒ B [̂c(P=⇒B,e)]. We extend f† by letting
it map c(P=⇒B,e) to e.
2. If R is an equational rule in T † such that f†∗R is derivable in U , we extend T †
with R as a specific rule.
Because we assumed all contexts and premise-families to be sequential, the inductive
definition is complete after countably many repetitions of the above process. Alterna-
tively, T † could be constructed as a suitable colimit.
The map f obviously factors as f = f† ◦ i where i : T → T † is induced by the
inclusion ΣT → ΣT † .
The map f† is conservative by construction. It obviously reflects equations, while
an object rule-boundary R in T †, such that e realises f†∗R in U , is realised by c(R,e).
It remains to be shown that the factorization is weakly universal. Consider a fac-
torization f = g ◦ j through a conservative map g : V → U , as in (6.2). There exists
a map r, not necessarily unique, that witnesses conservativity of g. The desired factor
h : T † → V is defined inductively: it acts like j on symbols of ΣT , and takes c(R,e) to
r(h∗R, e).
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Corollary 6.30. A raw theory T has a weakly universal conservative map t : Twf → T
where Twf is well-founded.
Proof. We take Twf = 〈 〉† and t = o†, as in Lemma 6.29, where o : 〈 〉 → T is
the unique map from the empty theory 〈 〉. Weak universality is immediate, and well-
foundedness of 〈 〉† is witnessed by the inductive nature of its construction.
Definition 6.31. The map t : Twf → T from Corollary 6.30 is called the well-founded
replacement of T .
Here, finally is the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.32. If T is acceptable, the map t : Twf → T has a section.
The theorem establishes a form of equivalence of Twf and T , because any con-
servative map r : U → V with a section s : V → U is an isomorphism up to
judgmental equality. Indeed, r ◦ s = idV because s is a section of r, while s ◦ r
is identity up to judgemental equality: given any derivable rule P =⇒ A type in U ,
the rule r∗P =⇒ r∗(s∗(r∗A)) ≡ r∗A is derivable in V by reflexivity, and hence
P =⇒ s∗(r∗A) ≡ A in U by conservativity of r. An analogous argument works for
term judgements.
Proof of Theorem 6.32. The theory Twf has symbols of the form c(P=⇒B,e), where B
is a closed boundary, but in the proof we will have to deal with boundaries that refer to
variables.
For this purpose, define the (variable-to-metavariable) promotion of an expression
e ∈ ExprcΣ(γ) to be the expression e˜ ∈ ExprcΣ+simp γ(0), cf. Definition 3.21, which
is e with the variables replaced by metavariables,
v˜ari := metai, and S˜(e) := S(〈e˜i〉i∈arg S).
The associated demotion is the instantiation Dγ ∈ InstΣ,γ(simp γ) which takes the
metavariables back to variables, Dγ(metai) = vari. Thus we have e = Dγ∗e˜.
One level up, given a premise-family P and a context Γ over Σ + αP , the pro-
motion of Γ is the extension P ; Γ˜ of P in which the variables of Γ are promoted to
metavariables of suitable types,
(P ; [˜ ]) := P and (P ; Γ˜ . A) := (P ; Γ˜); (` A˜ type).
We begin the construction of a section of t by defining a map d which maps se-
quential rules and rule-boundaries from T to Twf by replacing compound expressions
e with suitable symbols c(R,e) from Twf . When acting on contexts and judgements, d
takes a sequential rule-family P from T as an additional parameter, in which case we
write dP .
The map d recurses over a premise-family in T to give a premise-family in Twf :
d(〈 〉) := 〈 〉 and d(P ; (Γ ` J)) := (d(P ); dP (Γ ` J)).
Similarly, it takes a sequential context Γ over T + P to one over Twf + d(P ):
dP ([ ]) := [ ],
dP (Γ . A) := dP (Γ) . (D|Γ|∗ĉ((d(P );d˜P (Γ)=⇒ type),A˜)).
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In the second clause, dP recurses into Γ and extends it with the rather intimidating
D|Γ|∗ĉ((d(P );d˜P (Γ)=⇒ type),A˜),
which is just the generic application of the c-symbol for the promoted A˜, demoted back
to Γ. Note that (d(P ); d˜P (Γ)) = d(P ; Γ˜) and hence t∗(dP (Γ . A)) = Γ . A.
It remains to explain how dP maps a judgement Γ ` J over T + P to one over
Twf + d(P ). Here too we use the same method of demoting a generic application of a
symbol for a promoted expression:
dP (Γ ` A type) := (Γ′ ` A′ type),
dP (Γ ` t : A) := (Γ′ ` t′ : A′),
dP (Γ ` A ≡ B) := (Γ′ ` A′ ≡ B′),
dP (Γ ` s ≡ t : A) := (Γ′ ` s′ ≡ t′ : A′),
where
Γ′ := dP (Γ),
A′ := D|Γ|∗ĉ((d(P );Γ˜′=⇒ type),A˜),
B′ := D|Γ|∗ĉ((d(P );Γ˜′=⇒ type),B˜),
t′ := D|Γ|∗ĉ((d(P );Γ˜′=⇒:A˜′),t˜),
s′ := D|Γ|∗ĉ((d(P );Γ˜′=⇒:A˜′),s˜).
By having d map  to  the above clauses also provide the action of d on boundaries.
Finally, let d map a sequential rule P =⇒ J in T to the sequential rule d(P ) =⇒ J ′
where dP (` J) = (` J ′), and similarly for rule-boundaries.
We have arranged d in such a way that t∗(d(R)) = R for any sequential rule R
over T . Moreover, if R is derivable in T , then d(R) is derivable in Twf , by an appeal
to suitable symbol rules in Twf . For instance, d maps the rule P =⇒ A type to the
rule d(P ) =⇒ ĉ((d(P )=⇒ type),A) type. If the former is derivable in T then the latter
is a symbol rule of Twf .
At last, let us define the section s of t. Consider first a type symbol S ∈ ΣT .
Because T is acceptable, it has a unique symbol rule P =⇒ Ŝ type. When we map it
with d we get
d(P ) =⇒ ĉ((d(P )=⇒ type),Ŝ) type,
which is a symbol rule in Twf . We may therefore take sS := ĉ((d(P )=⇒ type),Ŝ).
A term symbol S ∈ ΣT is dealt with analogously. Its symbol rule takes the form
P =⇒ Ŝ : A, which is mapped by d to
d(P ) =⇒ ĉ((d(P )=⇒:A′),Ŝ) : A′,
where A′ = ĉ((d(P )=⇒ type),A), Again, this is a symbol rule in Twf , so we may define
sS := ĉ((d(P )=⇒:A′),Ŝ).
Example 6.33. We revisit Example 5.14, the type theory expressing type-in-type in
a cyclic fashion as ` u : El(u). Earlier we pointed out that the theory can be made
well-founded by using the defined type constant ` U ≡ El(u). The well-founded
replacement works much the same way, except that it is replete with many more defined
symbols. The analogue of U appears already at the first stage of the construction.
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Indeed, the rule-boundary 〈 〉 =⇒  type is realised by El(u), hence the well-founded
replacement contains the type constant U = c(〈 〉=⇒ type,El(u)). We also have the new
symbols
El = c((`a:U)=⇒ type,Êl) and u = c(=⇒:U,û),
and these suffice to express the type equation ` U ≡ El(u), which is a specific rule of
the well-founded replacement because it is mapped to a valid equation in the original
type theory.
7 Discussion and related work
We set out to give a detailed and general mathematical definition of dependent type
theories, accomplished by an analysis of their traditional accounts. Having completed
the task, let us take stock of what has been accomplished.
We calibrated abstraction at the level that keeps a connection with concrete syn-
tax, but also clearly identifies the category-theoretic structure underlying the abstract
syntax. As such, our work may serve as a theoretical grounding and a guideline for
practical implementations of type theories on one hand, and on the other as a ladder
to be climbed and discarded by those who wish to ascend to higher, more abstract
viewpoints of dependent type theories.
There is not much to remark on our treatment of raw syntax, as the topic has been
studied before and is well understood, except to remark that scope systems have served
us well as a general approach to scoping and binding of variables.
More interesting are the subsequent stages of our definition. Giving the definition
in generality forces us to isolate and precisely define various notions that are tradition-
ally treated only informally, and often only passed on in folklore rather than in writing.
For instance, we articulate precisely the distinction between the syntactic specification
of an inference rule, and the scheme of closure conditions that it begets — a distinction
which, once seen, was implicitly present all along, but which is not generally appreci-
ated or consciously articulated.
We initially considered raw theories as just a stepping stone towards the defini-
tion of well-presented type theories, but have come to feel that they are of significant
intrinsic interest. Their simplicity makes them easy to work with, and even though
they permit deviations from the orthodox teachings, they boast with a surprisingly rich
collection of meta-theorems.
The well-behavedness properties of raw rules and raw type theories, such as presup-
positivity, tightness, and congruity, took some effort to define and explain, but quickly
paid off. On a technical level, they allowed us to fine-tune the requirements that enable
the various meta-theorems. More importantly, once we incorporated them into our
type-theoretic vocabulary they streamlined communication and invigorated the mind
where there used to be just an uneasy adherence to heuristic techniques.
We hope that our selection of meta-theorems is illustrative enough to inspire further
generally applicable meta-theorems, and comprehensive enough to relieve future de-
signers of type theories from having to redo the work. We have intentionally restrained
any category-theoretic analysis of the landscape we explore, but it will be visible in the
background to many readers, demanding future exploration of the categorical structure
of the syntactic notions, both for its own sake and to connect with a general categorical
semantics. This, of course, we hope to return to in future work.
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How widely does our definition of type theories cast its net? It takes little ef-
fort to enumerate many examples of interest, such as variants of Martin-Löf type the-
ory (Martin-Löf, 1972), in both its intensional and extensional incarnations, homo-
topy type theory (Univalent Foundations Program, 2013), simple type theory (Church,
1932), some presentations of the higher-order logic of toposes (Lambek and Scott,
1986), etc. But it is equally easy to list counter-examples: System F (Girard, 1972;
Reynolds, 1974) and related type systems that directly quantify over all types, pure
type systems (Barendregt, 1992), cubical type theories (Cohen et al., 2015), cohesive
type theories (Schreiber and Shulman, 2014), etc. Can such a diverse collection of
formalisms be unified under the umbrella of an even more general definition of type
theories? Doubtlessly, our work can be pushed and stretched in various directions, and
we hope it will. But we also state again that we do not intend our definitions to be
definitive or prescriptive, nor consider our methods to be superior to others. After all,
type theory is an open-ended idea.
Several years ago Vladimir Voevodsky’s relentless inquiries into the precise math-
ematical underpinnings of type theories motivated us to undertake the study of general
type theories. We were hardly alone to do so. Voevodsky himself initially worked
to develop the framework of B-systems and C-systems (Voevodsky, 2014, 2016), but
these will remain tragically unfinished. There is by now a spectrum of various ap-
proaches to the meta-theory of type theories, which cannot be justly reviewed in the
remaining space. We only mention a selection of contemporaneous developments and
their relation to our work.
Logical framework approaches When discussing and presenting this work, we have
often been asked why we bothered, when logical frameworks (LF) (Harper et al., 1993;
Pfenning, 2001) already give a satisfactory definition of type theories.
The main answer is that most work with logical frameworks does not give a general
definition in the same sense that we are looking for. It sets up a framework within which
many type theories may be defined, but that is not quite the same thing. Indeed, at the
point when we were first embarking on the present project, no definition in a generality
close to our aims had been proposed in the LF literature (to our knowledge), nor could
we see how to do so using LF methods. Since then, Uemura has succeeded in giving a
very clean general definition using the LF; we discuss that work in detail below.
A significant secondary motivation for the present approach, though, was to di-
rectly recover the standard “naïve” presentation of particular type theories, in specific
examples. This problem is, by design, something that LF-based approaches bypass
entirely. One may argue — as some have — that this desire is misguided: that since
LF-based approaches are so much cleaner, naïve syntax should be discarded as obso-
lete, and LF-embedded presentations of theories preferred as primitive. We however
find that view somewhat unsatisfactory, for several reasons.
Firstly, even if we should be always reading type theories as LF presentations,
we have not been. At least within the literature on constructive type theory in the
tradition of Martin-Löf, most work still uses the naïve reading, including the work
of Martin Hofmann (Hofmann, 1997) and others (Martin-Löf, 1972; Streicher, 1991;
Univalent Foundations Program, 2013). Or rather, most of the literature stays silent
about the issue, but where the intended reading is made clear, it tends to be the naïve
one. Secondly, most work using LF approaches explicitly comments on the setup, and
often gives or cites adequacy theorems. This seems to suggest that writers agree that
the correctness of LF presentations of type theories rests, in part, on their connection to
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the naïve presentations. Finally, it seems very difficult to adopt a position of completely
discarding the naïve readings, and reading all presentations of type theories always as
shorthands for their LF embedding. This is because the framework is itself a type
theory, whose presentation must sooner or later be given the naïve reading, rather than
as embedded in a further framework — it cannot be “turtles all the way”.
We therefore believe it is important to have both the naïve and LF-based definitions
of syntax defined and developed in as wide a generality as possible (as well as other
approaches, such as those of categorical logic). The naïve approach is most natural and
conceptually basic. The LF approach is cleaner and simpler to set up, and easier to
analyse and apply for some purposes. Both should be available, and connected by an
adequacy theorem, not just in special cases but in generality.
Uemura’s general type theories Another general definition of type theories has re-
cently been given by Taichi Uemura. Indeed, (Uemura, 2019) provides two definitions,
one semantic and one syntactic, and shows their correspondence with a general initial-
ity theorem.
In terms of generality, Uemura’s definition essentially subsumes ours and indeed
generalises much further, encompassing type theories with different judgement forms,
while still retaining enough structure to allow proofs of important type-theoretic meta-
theorems. It therefore quite satisfactorily solves one of the major goals we set out to
solve with the present project.
On inspection, however, Uemura’s approach is sufficiently different that it is com-
plementary with our approach, rather than subsuming it. His syntactic definition is
given via a particularly ingenious use of a logical framework; as with other LF-based
approaches, this keeps the setup very clean, but means that in specific examples, it does
not so closely recover the standard naïve reading of the theory in question.
It does not, therefore, address our secondary goal of taking seriously the naïve
reading of syntax, and directly recovering it in examples. We therefore hope that it
should be possible in the future to connect our syntactic definition with Uemura’s by
means of a generalised adequacy theorem, and show that for theories with Martin-Löf’s
original four judgment forms, the two approaches are equivalent.
Other general definitions of dependent type theories Independently of our work,
Guillaume Brunerie has proposed a general syntactic definition of dependent type the-
ories (Brunerie, 2020a), and is formalising it in Agda (Brunerie, 2020b). His approach
is very similar to ours, which we see as a welcome convergence of ideas.
Valery Isaev has also proposed a definition of dependent type theories, in (Isaev,
2017). His approach is semantic, avoiding syntax with binding, and defining dependent
type theories as certain essentially algebraic theories extending the theory of categories
with families. The generality of his definition seems to be roughly similar to ours,
but a precise comparison seems slightly subtle to state, and is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
Meta-theory of type theory in type theory When one takes type theory seriously
as a foundation of mathematics, it is natural and even imperative, to develop the meta-
theory of type theories in type theory itself. Whereas in the LF approach the expressiv-
ity of the ambient formalism is curbed to ensure an adequacy theorem, here we gladly
trade adequacy for working in a full-fledged dependent type theory.
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Such a project has been undertaken by Thorsten Altenkirch and Ambrus Kaposi (Al-
tenkirch and Kaposi, 2016). Broadly speaking, a specific object type theory is con-
structed in one fell swoop as a quotient-inductive-inductive type (QIIT) that incorpo-
rates all judgement forms, the structural and the specific rules. The inductive character
of the definition automatically provides the correct notion of derivation, while the am-
bient type theory guarantees that only derivable judgements can be constructed — the
“raw” stage is completely side-stepped. The quotienting capabilities favourably relate
the ambient propositional equality with the object-level judgmental equality. From a se-
mantic point of view, the construction is the type-theoretic analogue of an initial-model
construction. The ingenuity of the definition allows one to prove many meta-theorems
quite effortlessly, especially with the aid of a proof assistant.
Our bottom-up approach can add little to the setup in terms of abstraction, but can
possibly provide useful clues on how to pass from the case-by-case presentations of
object type theories to a single type whose inhabitants are (presentations of) general
type theories. For instance, the type of well-presented type theories would have to
improve on our staged definitions by joining them into a single mutually recursive
inductive definition that would incorporate the above QIIT construction of a single
object-level theory, suitably adapted, as the realisation of a well-presented theory.
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A Formalisation in Coq
We have partially formalised our work in the Coq proof assistant (Coq development
team, 2020) on top of the HoTT library (Bauer et al., 2017). The formalisation is
publicly available at (Lumsdaine et al., 2020), wherein further instructions are given
on how to compile and use the formalisation. The formalisation will continue to evolve
in future; the description here refers to the version tagged as arXiv.
The formalisation broadly follows the structure of the paper. Table 1 lists selected
major definitions and theorems from the paper, along with the names of the correspond-
ing items in the formalisation, if any. Almost all material of Sections 2, 3 and 4 has
been formalised, as has some but not all of Section 5. Versions of the main definitions
of Section 6 are also formalised, but at time of writing, their treatment in the formali-
sation has non-trivial differences from the definitions here; such items are marked with
an asterisk.
Throughout the paper we worked rigorously but informally, and without discussing
which mathematical foundation might be sufficient to carry out the constructions and
proofs. On this topic we may consult the formalisation.
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Paper Formalisation
Family (Definition 2.1) Auxiliary.Family.family
Closure rule (Definition 2.6) Auxiliary.Closure.rule
Closure system (Definition 2.6) Auxiliary.Closure.system
Derivation (Definition 2.8) Auxiliary.Closure.derivation
Scope system (Definition 3.1) Syntax.ScopeSystem.system
De Bruijn scope system (Example 3.2) Examples.ScopeSystemExamples.DeBruijn
Syntactic class (Definition 3.6) Syntax.SyntacticClass.class
Arity (Definition 3.6) Syntax.Arity.arity
Signature (Definition 3.8) Syntax.Signature.signature
Signature map (Definition 3.10) Syntax.Signature.map
Raw expressions (Definition 3.11) Syntax.Expression.expression
Raw substitution (Definition 3.16) Syntax.Substitution.raw_substitution
Metavariable extension (Definition 3.22) Syntax.Metavariable.extend
Instantiation of syntax (Definition 3.24) Syntax.Metavariable.instantiate_expression
Raw context (Definition 4.1) Typing.Context.raw_context
Raw rule (Definition 4.18) Typing.RawRule.raw_rule
Instantiation of derivations (Corollary 4.43) Typing.RawTypeTheory.instantiate_derivation
Associated closure system (Definition 4.21) Typing.RawRule.closure_system
Structural rules (Definition 4.29) Typing.StructuralRule.structural_rule
Congruence rule (Definition 4.34) Typing.RawRule.raw_congruence_rule
Raw type theory (Definition 4.36) Typing.RawTypeTheory.raw_type_theory
Acceptable rule (Definition 5.7) (not formalised)
Acceptable type theory (Definition 5.12) Metatheorem.Acceptability.acceptable
Presuppositions theorem (Theorem 5.15) Metatheorem.Presuppositions.presupposition
Admissibility of renaming (Lemma 5.18) Metatheorem.Elimination.rename_derivation
Admissibility of substitution (Lemma 5.20) Metatheorem.Elimination.substitute_derivation
Admissibility of equality substitution (Lemma 5.21) Metatheorem.Elimination.substitute_equal_derivation
Elimination of substitution (Theorem 5.22) Metatheorem.Elimination.elimination
Uniqueness of typing (Theorem 5.23) (not formalised)
Inversion principle (Theorem 5.27) (not formalised)
Sequential context (Definition 6.4) ContextVariants.wf_context_derivation(∗)
Sequential rule (Definition 6.8) (not formalised)
Well-presented rule (Definition 6.18) (not formalised)
Well-presented type theory (Definition 6.20) Presented.TypeTheory.type_theory(∗)
Well-founded replacement (Theorem 6.32) (not formalised)
Table 1: The correspondence between the paper and the formalisation (Lumsdaine
et al., 2020). Items marked with (∗) differ non-trivially from their counterparts in the
paper.
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Our formalisation is built on top of a homotopy type theory library with an eye
towards future formalisation of the categorical semantics of type theories, but is so far
agnostic with respect to commitments such as the Univalence axiom or the Uniqueness
of identity proofs. The only axiom that we use is function extensionality. In other
words, the code can be read in plain Coq.
The formalisation confirms that our development is constructive, there are no uses
of excluded middle or the axiom of choice.
It is a bit harder to tell how many universes we have used, because Coq relieves the
user from explicit handling of universes. Two seem to be enough, one to serve as a base
and another to work with families over the base. The base universe can be very small,
say consisting of the decidable finite types, if we limit attention to finitary syntax only.
We rely in many places on the ability to perform inductive constructions and carry
out proofs by induction, and so we require some meta-theoretic support for these. Of
course, there is no shortage of induction in Coq, and even a fairly weak set theory will
have the capability to construct the necessary inductive structures, whereas the higher-
order logic of toposes would have to be extended with W -types. Alternatively, we
could restrict to finitary syntax, contexts and rules throughout to allow Gödelization of
syntax and reliance on induction supplied by arithmetic.
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